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The Editor's Note

As we celebrate the third issue of the *Anemoi*, let us not forget the reasons for its establishment. The humanities and social sciences occupy an important role in our society as the vanguards of culture at a time when some advocate for vocation over passion. Surely as departments are downsized and age-old disciplines are questioned, we look upon certain enterprises such as undergraduate journals with an eye of suspicion. Why should we propagate research that does not directly prolong life or create iPhones? What is the immediate benefit of a nuanced opinion on literature in the Age of Twitter, when 150-words-or-less suffices for a developed thought? In fact, undergraduate journals are needed now more than ever: not simply as another superficial line on the already inflated CV, but as an outlet of pure academic expression.

This year's iteration of the *Anemoi* features young scholars who possess a special passion for academic achievement from across the country. These six papers offer original perspectives on topics ranging from art history to religious philosophy. The editorial board thoroughly vetted each paper in a double blind review process to present the reader with only the strongest theses garnered by the fairest professional methods. Our review board consists not just of fellow undergraduates from various institutions across the country, but also of recent graduates and established scholars. Of course, without the guidance and advice of Professor David Rohrbacher, the *Anemoi* would not enjoy its current success and high academic standards.

The *Anemoi* would also like to thank Laura Costa, the winner of this year's cover art contest. Laura's original design embodies the artistic nature of both the journal and its contributors. Along with our sponsor and cover artist, the *Anemoi* sincerely thanks the reviewers, without whom none of this would be possible. Finally, the *Anemoi* thanks you the reader for taking interest in such a bold endeavor. Academics write to be read, and undergraduate work is no exception. Without you, there would be no audience and thus no *Anemoi*.

The Editors,
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A Marionette Act: Imperial Biases in the Structure of *De Vita Caesarum*

Abstract

Tactics of persuasion present in Suetonius's De Vita Caesarem are explored as they relate to overall structure, syntax and lexical semantics. This paper draws upon scholar Larry Cochran's argument that Suetonius's biographies are strikingly lauding or marring of the imperial subject. Assuming this argument, the paper then investigates how Suetonius persuades the reader towards a positive or negative conception of an emperor by manipulating the biographies through ordering of topics, the juxtaposition of sentences, and the connotation of selected vocabulary.

Suetonius' *De Vita Caesarum* has been both praised and condemned by scholarship for nearly two millennia. Andrew Wallace-Hadrill claims Suetonius's writing has "no poetry, no pathos, no persuasion…"[1] Similarly C.P. Jones dismisses *De Vita Caesarum* as a book of gossip and "lowly morals."[2] On the other hand, Gaston Boissier praises Suetonius' departure from history proper, his unique style, and his focus on themes that other authors never before dared to discuss.[3] Nevertheless it cannot be disputed that *De Vita Caesarum* offers a rare glimpse into the personal lives of the Roman emperors unlike any other source. Over the years scholars have dissected the sources, themes, structure, and language of *De Vita Caesarum*, but none have focused on the semantics of the structure. Bias and structure in *De Vita Caesarum* have been studied separately at length, but for one reason or another, structure as it relates to this bias has not been articulated in previous scholarship.

In this essay, I will first uphold the argument that Suetonius leaves the reader with an overall good or bad impression of the emperors, calling upon a study conducted by scholar Larry Cochran. Based on the findings of Cochran's work, I then explore how Suetonius strategically manipulates the structure of *De Vita Caesarum* on different levels and its significance for the impression of the reader. Both topical and lexical comparisons between favored and unpopular subjects very clearly show Suetonius going to great lengths to preserve the honor of those he considered good emperors and, likewise, marring the reputation of those he considered bad emperors. This analysis is necessary to our understanding not only of the uniqueness of *De Vita Caesarum* but also of the early tactics of persuasion in the history of literature.

In general Suetonius casts either a good or bad light conclusively on each emperor. Scholar Larry Cochran, a Canadian psychologist and a professor emeritus at the University of British Columbia, statistically confirmed Suetonius's polarized opinions of

[1] Andrew Wallace-Hadrill, *Suetonius: The Scholar and His Caesars,* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1983), 19.
[2] See Jones, 1971: 72-80 for harsh critique of Suetonius' *De Vita Caesarum*
[3] See Boissier, 1906: 75-82 for discussion of praiseworthy aspects of Suetonius's styles and themes

his imperial subjects by employing the repertory grid method, designed to measure implicit theories of personality. [4] He conferred with the head of the Classics Department at the University of Victoria and rated the emperors of the *Twelve Caesars* on a five-point scale of various personality traits and its opposite, such as cruel/merciful and treacherous/loyal. Cochran calculated the numbers and found that fifty out of fifty-five traits had a significant statistical correlation to other similarly negative or positive traits. For example, overwhelmingly, emperors that were described by Suetonius as irresponsible also were described as cruel, treacherous, and self-indulgent. On the positive side, Julius, Augustus, Vespasian, and Titus stand out. The *vitae* of Caligula, Nero, and Tiberius, on the other hand, are particularly and consistently negative.[5] I draw on Cochran's study throughout this paper but will first call upon it to support a narratological argument of the overall organization of *De Vita Caesarum*.

The order of Suetonius' presentation of biographical topics is critically significant in persuading the reader towards an overall good or bad impression of the emperor at hand. Suetonius's distinctive "abandonment of chronology in the main section of his imperial lives" is very significant.[6] Most scholars explain this unique organization with philologist Friedrich Leo's theory that Suetonius applied an ancient biographical method used for telling the lives of literary men and transferred it to his biographies of Roman emperors.[7] Osgood outlines this method, developed by the ancient scholar and writer Varro, as including background, birth, and early life, followed by treatment of the author's work, and then his death.[8] All of the lives in *De Vita Caesarum* mimic this overall structure: beginning with ancestry and birth, followed by an account of the reign, and ending with the subject's death.[9] Structure of the individual lives has been dissected further. Osgood notes that the arrangement of topics differs between good and bad emperors in the section concerning the emperor's rule. However, he fails to discuss its significance.[10] University of Notre Dame Professor Keith Bradley, in his *The Imperial Ideal in Suetonius' Caesares,* expresses his belief that Suetonius formats the biographies in this way to facilitate comparison between the idealized public image of the emperor, with whom the reader is familiar, to that of his private sphere, which presumably would be much more of a mystery.[11] On the contrary, I argue that Suetonius utilizes this structure to create a lasting positive or negative impression of the subject on the reader. The reigns of the good emperors are separated into categories of public and private affairs. Because the public achievements of the good emperors were great and glorified, addressing this topic early on in the good emperors' biographies serves to emphasize their greatness from the start. For example, the reader is made aware of Vespasian's upstanding character well before his personal life is described. Suetonius reports that

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[4] Kelly, G. *The Psychology of Personal Constructs*. New York: 1955.
[5] Cochran, *"Suetonius' Conception of Imperial Character,* (Project Muse 3,1980): 196.
[6] Josiah Osgood, *A Suetonius reader: Selections from The Lives of the Caesars and The Life of Horace, (Mundelein: Bolchazy-Carducci Publishers, 2011),* xxiv. See also Robert Graves, *Suetonius The Twelve Caesars.* (London: Penguin, 2007),: xxvi-xxix for discussion of topical organization and Donna W. Hurley, *The Caesars* (Hackett Pub. Co., 2011): xx-xxiv for examination of structure of individual lives.
[7] Graves, 2007: xxviii-xxx ; Osgood, 2011: xxiv; Hurley, 2011: xx
[8] Osgood, 2011: xxiv
[9] Graves, 2007: xxvi.
[10] Osgood, 2011: xxv.
[11] Keith Bradley, *The Imperial Ideal in Suetonius' 'Caesares,'* (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1972), 3727.

Vespasian governed provinces in Africa with the greatest honor and justice.[12] Furthermore, he is characterized in his military career as one who could be trusted with great powers without risk as well as a man of great promise and reputation whose first priority was to strengthen and embellish the State.[13] Characterizing well-liked emperors first in the public domain emphasizes their popularity, which further convinces the reader of their greatness. The *vitae* of the good emperors are purposely structured so that the reader's first impression the emperor is positive and memorable. On the other hand, Suetonius formats the biographies of the bad emperors to achieve the opposite effect. The reign of the bad emperors is separated into positive then negative aspects rather than by public and private spheres as the good emperors' *vitae* are. Although with the bad emperors Suetonius touches upon the positive topics first, this portion is so brief and general that it is completely overwhelmed by the negative accounts in both length and detail. Thus, the biographies of the bad emperors all end on a highly critical, negative note, leaving readers with an abhorrent taste in their mouths. This structure is evident in the *vita* of Tiberius. A curt description of Tiberius's modesty and support of public morality is followed by thirty-three detailed passages of Tiberius's irresponsibility, gluttony, sexual perversions, cruelty, and greed. The layout of the biographical information serves to emphasize the bad traits of the bad emperors.[14] Additionally, by reporting the few good traits altogether first and then emphasizing the bad traits, Suetonius connotes the bad emperors as treacherous, chameleon personalities who were able to feign benevolence before showing his true colors. A different structure intermixing the positive and negative or reversing the sequence would be far less effective and would leave the impression of a conflicted, capricious individual rather than one of pure evil. In this way, negative aspects reported in detail and intended to shock the reader overwhelm the biography of the bad emperors. Suetonius cleverly organizes his writing in a way that implicitly influences the reader toward a certain point of view.

Strategic structuring can be observed on the paragraph level as well. Donna Hurley in particular discusses paragraphic structuring in Suetonius's writing at length.[15] Hurley asserts that Suetonius's "drive towards order and tidiness" explains this formatting.[16] I argue otherwise: Suetonius plays with structure on this level to develop a context that bolsters his central positive or negative argument of the subject. This is especially apparent when Suetonius reports conflicting evidence. Suetonius includes information in every biography that does not fit nicely into his all-or-nothing, good-or-bad argument of imperial character. This serves two purposes. First, it creates the illusion of objectivity. Second, by proposing a potential counterargument and then negating it, Suetonius actually strengthens his original argument. An example of this technique is conspicuous in *Divus Augustus*.

> *Adulteria quidem exercuisse ne amici quidem negant, excusantes sane non libidine, sed ratione commissa, quo facilius consilia adversariorum per cuiusque mulieres exquireret.*

[12] *Vespasian* 4.2.
[13] *Vespasian* 5; *Vespasian* 8.1.
[14] For another example of Suetonius emphasizing bad character early on in a biography, see *Domitian* 3
[15] Hurley, 2011: xxiii-xxvi.
[16] Hurley, 2011: xxvi.

> Not even his friends could deny that Augustus certainly had committed adulteries, (although) justifying sensibly not with passion but with reason the crimes, by which he had more easily sought out the plans through the women of his enemies. (*Aug*. 69)[17]

Here Suetonius includes circumstantial information that serves to not only dismiss notorious adulteries but also characterize Augustus as a deliberate, dedicated statesman. Evidence that could be damaging to Augustus' character is presented strategically to imply that Augustus sacrifices *even his body* for the welfare of the state and thereby support Suetonius' central argument of his character. Suetonius goes to great lengths to protect the wholesome image of the good emperors.[18] Suetonian translator and scholar Barry Baldwin recognizes this tendency of Suetonius and cites a specific example when Suetonius "tumbles over himself" to absolve Augustus of homosexual accusations on the grounds of "*praesentis et posterae vitae castitate*" (present and later purity of his [sex] life) (Aug. 71).[19] It is important to note here how vague this justification is; it shows Suetonius making an obvious effort to defend his preconceived theories of character even when there is not legitimate defense. Another example of Suetonius utilizing context to blur mixed messages occurs in the biography Divus Vespasian.

> *Non temere quis punitus insons reperietur nisi absente eo et ignaro aut certe invito atque decepto.*
>
> My researches show that no innocent party was ever punished during Vespasian's reign except behind his back or while he was absent from Rome, unless by deliberate defiance of his wishes or by misinforming him…(Vespasian 15.1)[20]

Notice here how Suetonius follows a potentially controversial statement with a substantial list of excuses in favor of Vespasian.

Suetonius juxtaposes controversies with justifications or excuses to support his argument of bad emperors as well. Specifically, Suetonius attempts to undermine the generosity of Tiberius:

> *Publice munificentiam bis omnino exhibuit, proposito milies sestertium gratuito in trienni tempus, et rursus quibusdam dominis insularum, quae in monte Caelio deflagrarant, pretio restituto. Quorum alterum magna difficultate nummaria populo auxilium flagitante coactus est facere… nec res expediretur; alterum ad mitigandam temporum atrocitatem… Militi post duplicata ex Augusti testamento legata nihil umquam largitus est, praeterquam singula milia denariorum praetorianis… et quaedam munera Syriacis legionibus…*
>
> Tiberius exhibited generosity publicly altogether only twice. Once 100 million sesterces, having been offered, free of interest for three years, and another

[17] All translations are mine, unless otherwise noted.
[18] For more examples, see *Divus Julius* 48, *Divus Augustus* 40.3-41, 47.1 67.1
[19] Baldwin, 1983: 504.
[20] Translation by Robert Graves, 2007: 283.

> instance having restored out of pocket certain apartment buildings on the Caelian Hill, which had been destroyed in a fire. Forced to do the former by the people demanding urgently for help in a time of great financial trouble… (but) it failed to relieve the situation. The second time too was for the purpose of alleviating the (financial) pressure of the times… After doubling the inheritances from Augustus to the soldiers, not ever was largesse given, except 1000 denarii… and some other gifts. (Tiberius 48)

In this excerpt Suetonius bends over backwards to denigrate Tiberius' character. Excuses and criticisms are injected to dismiss the good-natured behavior as an exception under dire circumstances. Suetonius jumps at the opportunity to highlight Tiberius as an inadequate leader by pointing out the failure of the three-year loan in improving the economy. Furthermore Suetonius' selection of words and construction of sentences here is notable. The passive verb *coactus est,* "having been forced", is tactfully selected to insinuate Tiberius as evil, greedy, and unwilling to help his people in need. Additionally Suetonius employs the passive throughout the passage, for example, *proposito, restituto, coactus est,* and *largitus est,* which distances Tiberius from the benevolent actions and changes the focus of the sentences from "who did what" to "what was done." Scholar Ray Laurence, in *Roman Passions,* notes that a gift of any kind given from the emperor was an "expression of his great love for his people."[21] This social connotation may be exactly what Suetonius attempts to dissociate Tiberius from because it would damage the rest of his argument of Tiberius as a terrible character.

An example of how Suetonius cleverly crafts sentences can be found in the *vita* of Claudius. First, I must acknowledge that Claudius is an exception of Suetonius' polarized opinion of emperors. Despite this, I include an excerpt from Claudius here because it is a very clear example of Suetonius' strategic structuring on the sentence level. Overall, the *vita* of Claudius is rather inconsistent. Suetonius notes that Claudius was "wise and prudent but also thoughtless and hasty."[22] Scholars Barry Baldwin and Larry Cochran both suggest that this may have had to do with conflicting public opinions of Claudius due to his disabilities. In this particular example, moreover, Suetonius is characterizing Claudius as a man of weak character. How Suetonius chooses to craft these sentences here is fascinating:

> *Mater Antonia portentum eum hominis dictitabat, nec absolutum a natura, sed tantum incohatum; ac si quem socordiae argueret, stultiorem aiebat filio suo Claudio. Avia Augusta pro despectissimo semper habuit, non affari nisi rarissime, non monere nisi acerbo et brevi scripto aut per internuntios solita. Soror Livilla cum audisset quandoque imperaturum, tam iniquam et tam indignam sortem p. R. palam et clare detestata est. Nam avunculus maior Augustus quid de eo in utramque partem opinatus sit, quo certius cognoscatur, capita ex ipsius epistulis posui.*
>
> (His) mother Antonia used to speak of him as a bad omen, having been begun by Nature and then flung aside; and if she was accusing someone of stupidity, she

[21] Ray Laurence. *Roman Passions: A History of Passions in Imperial Rome.* (London: Continuum, 2009), 19-20.

[22] Cochran, 1980: 192.

> used to say he is a greater fool than my son Claudius. His grandmother Augusta always had the greatest scorn for him and was not accustomed to speak to him except for the rarest occasions, and when she reproached him, she was accustomed to do so in short, harsh letters, or through intermediaries. His sister Livilla when at some time she had heard he would be emperor, she then openly and loudly prayed so that the Roman people might be spared from so cruel and undeserved a fortune. For the opinion of his great uncle Augustus of him may have been one or the other sides, which is not known for certain, (so) I placed (here) letters of his own source. (*Claudius* 3.2)

In all of *De Vita Caesarum,* the emperor is nearly always the subject of every sentence. In this passage, there is a notable departure from this typical syntax: family members are the subjects, and Claudius is the direct object. Additionally, Suetonius places the names of the family members in the emphatic first position. On a very minute level, this supports Suetonius' later characterization of Claudius as the "toady" of his family members, wives, and freedmen.[23] Claudius is portrayed in his *vita* as weak and gullible but of good intent. A defining aspect of his biography, which works towards winning over the reader's heart, is how Suetonius portrays him as pitiful, undervalued, and mistreated. These attributes are conveyed in these sentences. Furthermore, this passage is at the very beginning of Claudius' biography, upholding my previous argument that the overall structure introduces the reader early on to the subjects' character.

Thus far I have examined the structure of Suetonius' writing on several different levels and its significance in influencing the reader. Lastly, I argue that Suetonius strategizes lexically, selecting specific language that serves to drive home a certain viewpoint to the reader. Although Barry Baldwin claims that "there is no reason" behind the particular vocabulary used in *De Vita Caesarum,* I disagree. As a biographer, Suetonius must consolidate and harmonize the actions and attributes of the subject to construct what appears to the reader as a single unified personality.[24] In order to accomplish this, Suetonius must carefully select language with intent to portray the subject in a certain light. An example of Suetonius' use of language for the purpose of upholding a good emperor can be observed in the *vita* of Titus. Suetonius very deliberately selects his language to defend Titus' affair with Queen Berenice and "his troop of toy boys and eunuchs."[25] He accomplishes this by creating an image of Titus as the victim with certain words. He sent Berenice away from Rome *invitus, invita,* "he unwilling, she unwilling" (Titus 7). The inclusion of these two words creates a heart-wrenching image of Titus and Berenice giving up their love for the State and turns a negative accusation of an affair into a positive example of Titus' character and sacrifice. In the same passage, Suetonius utilizes the technique again.

> *Quosdam e gratissimis delicatorum… non modo fovere prolixius, sed spectare omnino in publico coetu supersedit.*

[23] Hurley, 2011: xxii
[24] Larry R. Cochran, "Suetonius' Conception of Imperial Character."
[25] Graves, 2007: 290.

> Titus also sends away his most beloved young paramours giving up *not only* sexual activities but also dancing entertainment entirely (Titus 7).

The use of the superlative *gratissimis* and the inclusion of the adverb *omnino* add an exaggerated tone to the sentence in order to further stress the magnitude of Titus' sacrifices.

On the other hand, Suetonius' choice vocabulary serves in conjunction with subject matter and context to cast a negative light on the bad emperors. In particular when Suetonius deals with Nero's death:

> *Talem principem paulo minus quattuordecim annos perpessus terrarum orbis tandem destituit…*
>
> After the world had put up with such a ruler for nearly fourteen years, it at last cast him off… (Nero 40)[26]

Suetonius could simply report that Nero died, but he chooses not to and this is very significant. Suetonius's language in this passage, contrary to what Baldwin might argue, is selected with reason to drive home exactly how vile and worthless Nero truly was. Thus on the minutest level, Suetonius crafts his writing, using vivid, charged vocabulary to bolster his central argument of the subject.

In conclusion Suetonius uses great finesse in his construction of the *vitae* as a whole, the passages, and the sentences as well. He presents the information tactfully and uses language with positive or negative connotations to detail and emphasize certain information. In this way Suetonius is very much like a marionette's puppeteer in that he takes his sources as they are but pulls various textual strings, manipulating the sequence, context, and language, in synchrony to depict the subjects as either good or bad. This investigation of structure as it relates to bias is necessary in understanding Suetonius' *De Vita Caesarum*, and in the process, recognizing tactics of persuasive writing in the antiquity.

[26] Translation by J.C. Rolfe, Loeb Classical Library, 1914, http://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Roman/Texts/Suetonius/12Caesars/Nero*.html

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Theology, Epistemology, and Intent: Osiander's Preface to Copernicus' *De Revolutionibus*

Abstract

Before the publication of Nicolaus Copernicus' De Revolutionibus Oribum Cœlestium, its editor, the controversial Lutheran theologian Andreas Osiander, attached a short preface without the consent of the author. The preface asserts that the astronomical hypotheses of Copernicus are useful only as tools for astronomical calculations, and cannot present any truths about the celestial realm. Due to the revolutionary nature of De Revolutionibus, this preface has come under much criticism in later generations. This paper examines Osiander's addition in light of his unique theology, and analyses the particular connections therein. To understand the motivation and intent of Osiander in the writing of this short but influential addendum, it is crucial to see it as a work of theologically informed epistemology. As opposed to the popular view that Osiander's goal was simply to prevent conservative censorship and outcry, a thorough analysis of both Osiander's wider theological corpus and the context of his role as editor of De Revolutionibus shows that his addition was primarily motivated by his theological considerations. Osiander is indirectly concerned with epistemology, and in his wider theology places extreme precedence on divinity over temporality. Once his preface is viewed from within such a frame of reference, the connection becomes unmistakable.

Lutheran theologian Andreas Osiander, in the editing of Nicolaus Copernicus' *De Revolutionibus Oribum Cœlestium*, appends a short prefatory note, titled "To the Reader Concerning the Hypothesis of this Work."[1] The intent of "To the Reader" is to argue that *De Revolutionibus* contains "nothing in the way of certainty," and that all astronomical hypotheses are not verifiable as actual truth, they must therefore be considered simply as tools for calculation.[2] This creates controversy in the scientific community; Kepler later asks, "Osiander, what desperation drove you to go so far as to say that nothing certain […] can be derived from astronomy?"[3] It is this question, though rhetorical, that I address in this paper. While much has been written and conjectured about the consequences of "To the Reader," this paper will focus instead on Osiander's own motivations, and the

[1] [Andreas Osiander], "To the Reader Concerning the Hypothesis of this Work," in Nicolaus Copernicus, *On* the *Revolutions of the Heavenly Spheres*, trans. Charles Glenn Wallis, in *Ptolemy, Copernicus, Kepler* (Chicago: Encyclopædia Britannica, 1952), 505-6. Cf. Nicolaus Copernicus, "Preface and Dedication to Pope Paul III," in ibid., 506-9. Osiander places his preface immediately before Copernicus' own, which is titled "Preface and Dedication." To avoid confusion, both prefaces will be referred to by their titles in this paper.

[2] [Osiander], "To the Reader," 506.

[3] Johannes Kepler, *A Defense of Tycho Against Ursus*, trans. N. Jardine, in *The Birth of the History and Philosophy of Science* (Cambridge: University of Cambridge Press, 1984), 151.

place of his theology therein, particularly his unique theology of justification. Osiander's "To the Reader" cannot be read as a work decontextualized from his wider theological considerations, but must be viewed as a work inspired by and infused with his particular theology. It is evident, once we consider the specifics of Osiander's theology, that his epistemology cannot be separated from his theology, and that his motivation in writing and publishing the "To the Reader," against the explicit will of Copernicus, stemmed foremost from the importance of this epistemology to his theology.

While Andreas Osiander has not passed through history unremembered, his memorial often comes from two distinct traditions, though from both he is often presented in an unflattering light. Due to the fact that he was a very antagonistic and stubborn man,[4] and that his bitter theological dispute over the nature of justification was ended prematurely by his death, his legacy in Protestant theology is generally seen as heretical.[5] Conversely, though it occupied relatively little of his time and effort, he is continually remembered in the context of the Scientific Revolution as the editor of Copernicus' *De Revolutionibus*, and, more infamously, as the author of the unsigned "To the Reader." Beginning with Kepler and his contemporaries, he is here often maligned as well.[6] Unfortunately, these two schools of thought rarely collaborate with their views on Osiander; theological considerations may add a paragraph's mention of Osiander's involvement with Copernicus,[7] and considerations of the History of Science rarely delve deeper than affording Osiander the title of "Lutheran theologian."[8] With this paper I attempt to add one small piece to this sparse space by considering the context of "To the Reader," specifically in light of Osiander's emphasis on divinity in his particular interpretation of Lutheran theology, and the subsequent rejection of empirical epistemology.

Before applying Osiander's theology to the epistemological argument of "To the Reader," it is important to understand the theology as such, especially that which defines Osiander's theology against that of his contemporaries. As thoroughgoing reformer, Osiander was at the forefront of the Reformation, and followed closely on the heels of Luther.[9] It was only after Luther's death that the nuances of Osiander's interpretation of

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[4] Osiander is known for his stubbornness and vitriol in his defense of his unorthodox and unpopular theological positions. See Mark Graubard, "Andreas Osiander: Lover of Science or Appeaser of its Enemies," *Science Education* 48, No. 2 (1964): 182-5, doi: 10.1002/sce.3730480211; David C. Steinmetz, "Andreas Osiander (1498–1552): The Renewal of Human Life," in *Reformers in the Wings: From Geller Von Kaysersberg to Theodore Beza* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 66, 69, EBSCOhost; Olli-Pekka Vainio, *Justification and Participation in Christ: The Development of the Lutheran Doctrine of Justification From Luther to the Formula of Concord (1580)* (Leiden: Brill, 2008), 95n2, EBSCOhost; Bruce Wrightsman, "Andreas Osiander's Contribution to the Copernican Achievement," in *The Copernican Achievement*, ed. Robert S. Westman (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975), 218-9.

[5] Graubard, "Lover of Science," 183; Steinmetz, "Renewal of Human Life," 64. For a detailed account of the various objections to his theology from within Lutheranism, see Timothy Wengert, *Defending Faith: Lutheran Responses to Andreas Osiander's Doctrine of Justification* (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2012).

[6] Kepler, "Apology," 150-4. For a summary of attacks against Osiander from the later scientific community, see Graubard, "Lover of Science," 175-82.

[7] cf. Steinmetz, "Renewal of Human Life," 66.

[8] Charles Glenn Wallis, trans., *On the Revolutions of the Heavenly Spheres*, by Nicolaus Copernicus, in *Ptolemy, Copernicus, Kepler*, 505n1. Cf. N. Jardine, *The Birth of History and Philosophy of Science* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 151n77; Maurice A. Finocciaro, ed., *The Essential Galileo* (Indianapolis: Hackett, 2008), 158n18.

[9] Wrightsman, "Osiander's Contribution," 217-21.

Luther's theology began to cause problems with his peers, compounding his already lackluster personal reputation.[10] Operating within a Lutheran theological framework, this paradigmatic detour from his Lutheran peers was his interpretation and expansion of the doctrine of justification. For Osiander's Lutheran rivals, particularly Philipp Melanchthon, justification is the imputation of Christ's righteousness in the sinner, by virtue of the sinner's faith coming to know Christ, especially knowing Christ's soteriological sacrifice. Through this process, the Holy Spirit, who invokes the faith in the first place, can begin the processes of renewal and sanctification, that is, the renewal of spirit and gradual change to Christlikeness.[11] Though there are many highly nuanced and differently emphasized interpretations of Luther's justification, I mention Melanchthon's in particular, as his disagreement with Osiander emerged as the epicenter of this debate after Luther's death.[12]

Osiander's theology of justification is very complex, and rests crucially on interpretation of specific aspects of Luther's own complex theology. I will therefore present a simplified account that includes the controversial elements relevant to this paper.[13] Osiander's justification condenses the processes that Melanchthon assigns to the Holy Spirit, and attributes them to the indwelling of Christ's divine nature. Whereas Melanchthon's faith apprehends the works, especially salvific, of Christ, Osiander's faith apprehends the divinity of Christ, and this mutual recognition allows for the indwelling of Christ, in which Christ himself becomes the righteousness of the sinner.[14] Through this process, the acts of justification, renewal, and sanctification are all encompassed in the notion of *vivificatio*, or "becoming alive and righteous […] through Christ's living presence in the individual by faith."[15] Imputation still has a part in this schema, but the sinner must already have the beginnings of vivification, have Christ the indwelling Christ before the imputation of righteousness, which is the actualization of the presence of the deific Christ in the sinner.[16] This theology is not particularly shocking in relation to contemporary theories after Luther's death.[17] What caused the loudest responses from his

[10] Wengert, *Defending Faith*, 11-25. Though this debate came after Luther's death in 1546, which itself was three years after the publication of *De Revolutionibus*, Osiander claimed that he had held and taught the same doctrines for years; Vainio "Genuine Interpretation," 97, 97n14.
[11] Vainio 67-9, Steinmetz 54, 67. For a brief consideration of Melanchthon's overall theological interactions, see Steinmez 49-57. For a thorough consideration of the evolution of his doctrine of justification, see Vainio 63-94.
[12] Wengert, *Defending Faith*, 4. See ibid., for a detailed compilation and consideration of the Osiandrian justification debate.
[13] For a more detailed summary of Osiander's theology, see Steinmetz 64-9. For thorough exegeses of his justification theology, see Vainio, "Genuine Interpretation" 95-108; Albrecht Ritschl, *A Critical History of the Christian Doctrine of Justification and Reconciliation*, trans. John S. Black (Edinburgh: Edmonston and Douglas, 1846), 214-33 https://play.google.com/store/books/details?id=sFoTAAAAYAAJ.
[14] Steinmetz, "Renewal of Human Life," 67-68; Vainio, "Genuine Interpretation," 96-7; Ritschl, *Critical History*, 218.
[15] Vainio, "Genuine Interpretation," 96. For Melenchthan's view of *vivificatio*, see ibid., 78. For a discussion of the relation between this *vivificatio* interpretation of Luther's justification and the Eastern Orthodox theology of *theosis*, see Wengert, *Defending Faith*, 2-4; for a thorough analysis, see Carl E. Braaten and Robert W. Jenson, *Union with Christ: The New Finnish Interpretation of Luther* (Grand Rapids: Wm.B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1998).
[16] Vainio, "Genuine Interpretation," 96; Ritschl, *Critical History*, 218.
[17] Vainio, "Genuine Interpretation," 97-8; Ritschl, *Critical History*, 226.

peers was that his theory necessitates a more radical distinction between the two natures of Christ.

Osiander's focus on indwelling, specifically on that of Christ's divine nature, deepens the separation between the temporal and the divine. Christ's human nature fulfilled its purpose with the sacrifice on the cross, providing satisfaction but not justification, as Osiander distinguishes. Satisfaction is eternally offered by the sacrifice of the human nature of Christ, but full salvation depends on the justification manifest by indwelling of Christ in the individual, and this is possible only through faith.[18] This distinction corresponds to the 'external' and 'internal' Words; Osiander reads Scripture as containing two Living Words, the external word as the literal gospel of the temporal Christ, which contains within it the internal Word, the Word of John 1, which is Christ as God.[19] This internal Word is the Christ that dwells in the individual. Subsequently, it is this indwelling Christ who wills the good works of the individual; " In keeping with this, the real righteousness is Christ alone."[20] It is this radical dependence on the divinity of God for all gracious benefit that is particularly relevant to this paper. It is essential to keep in mind this requirement for direct deific intervention, and its ultimate separation from all physical and temporal things. Save for Christ's incarnation and death, and the intervening gospel, our world is radically divorced from that of God.

While there are many extant examples of various parts of Osiander's theology, there is no clear explication of his approach to the study of nature, outside of "To the Reader." That said, from his other treatises, as well as his relationship to Luther's theology, we can infer certain points of his view of natural philosophy. One of the reasons it is so hard to define Osiander's approach to natural philosophy and natural theology is that Luther himself had no clear position on the matter. We can assume that whatever position he held falls under his mistrust for natural knowledge, as he says, "Aristotle's writings on *Physics, Metaphysics, On the Soul,* and *Ethics*, […] should be set aside along with all others that boast the treat of natural objects, for in fact they have nothing to teach about things natural or spiritual."[21] Recent Lutheran scholarship into this question of natural knowledge has provided some insight on the matter. In his survey of the matter, Mark U. Edwards, Jr. writes:

> The hiddenness of God in Lutheran theology suggests profound limits to what believers can know of God by natural reason alone. To be sure, Luther did not reject natural theology totally, but saw this natural knowledge as deeply confused. In his later career he largely stripped it

[18] Vainio, "Genuine Interpretation," 99-100; Steinmetz, "Renewal of Human Life," 67-9; Ritshl, *Critical History*, 216-8.
[19] Ritshl, *Critical History*, 216. Cf. Steinmetz, "Renewal of Human Life," 67-8; Wengert *Defending Faith*, 40. Cf. John 1:1.
[20] Vainio. "Genuine Interpretation," 102. Cf. Steinmetz, "Renewal of Human Life," 68, Ritshl, *Critical History*, 218.
[21] Martin Luther, "An Appeal to the Ruling Class of German Nationality as to the Amelioration of the State of Christendom," in *Martin Luther: Selections from his Writings*," ed. John Dillenberger (New York: Anchor Books, 1962), 470.

> of any power to capture an understanding of God apart from the paradoxical self-disclosure of God in Christ.[22]

Similarly, a recent Lutheran Church commission reported that there is a clear distinction in Luther "between knowing 'that there is a God' and knowing 'who or what God is,'"[23] the former being available to reason, and the latter only by the grace of God. Therefore, while Luther may not have disavowed the pursuit of natural knowledge, he not only had profound reservations about the possibility of reasoning knowledge of God, he seems to also have had some hesitations about the conclusions drawn from natural philosophy alone.

Picking up this complex and indefinite attitude from Luther, Osiander deepened it within his own theological nuances. He took Luther's reluctance to accept knowledge of divinity from natural reason, and applied it to his theology, in which divinity hold a particularly exclusive place. For Osiander, having held the necessity of Christ's divine presence for all good works, this divinity is necessarily associated with true knowledge. One translator of Copernicus, George Rosen, agrees with me in this, in that he writes, "[for Osiander] divine revelation is the only source of truth, [and] astronomical hypotheses are not concerned therewith."[24] This exclusive definition of true knowledge as divinely inspired creates a distinct class of unverifiable, but useful knowledge.

We see this new class employed in another of Osiander's works, translated into English in the 16th century.[25] In it, he gives advice to those suffering the plague. He characterizes the plague as punishment from God, and advises faith, penance, and charity as the best responses. Nevertheless, he has some noteworthy passages relating to natural philosophical theories. After characterizing the plague as undoubtedly of divine providence, he states that he would not condemn those who explain the plague by various natural philosophies, but warns that such knowledge lacks efficacy, compared to divine revelation.[26] Here, Osiander does not set up a conflict between natural philosophy and divine knowledge; instead, he insists upon the necessity of divine knowledge, but places such a radical divide between these types of knowledge that natural philosophical theories can still be pursued. In this vein, the philosophical theories are not united, but

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[22] "Characteristically Lutheran Leanings?" *Dialog: A Journal of Theology* 41, no. 1 (Spring 2002): 51, doi: 10.1111/1540-6385.00099.

[23] Commission on Theology and Church Relations, *The Natural Knowledge of God* (St. Louis: The Lutheran Church –Missouri Synod, 2013), 17, www.lcms.org/Document.fdoc?src=lcm&id=2431.

[24] George Rosen, introduction to *Three Copernican Treatises,* ed. George Rosen (New York: Columbia University Press, 1939), 25.

[25] Andrew [Andreas] Osiander, *How and whither a Christen man ought to flye the horrible plage of the pestilence: A sermon out f the Psalme, Qui habitat in adsutorio altissimi,* trans. [Miles Coverdale] *(*Southwarke: Jan Gough, 1537). http://gateway.proquest.com/openurl?ctx_ver=Z39.88-2003&res_id=xri:eebo&rft_id=xri:eebo:citation:99839998.

[26] "I wyll not entre agaynst them, that speake naturally therof, and saye: Suche plage commeth out of the influence of the starres, out of þe workynge of the Cometes, out of þe vnseasonable wether and alterynge of the ayre, out of the Southe wyndes, out of stynkynge waters, or out of foule mystes of the grounde: For such wysedome of theyrs wyl we leaue vnto them vndespysed, and not fyght there agaynst: But (as Christen men) we wyll holde vs vnto the worde of God, the same wyll we suffre to be oure moost hye wysedome, and geue credence vnto it, and follow it: and so shall we fynde muche better and surer instruccion." Ibid, §Aiiii.

offer differing explanations, compared to the single divine explanation. Thus, while "such wysedome of theyrs wyl we leaue vnto them vndespysed, and not fyght there agaynst," we shall "fynde muche better and surer instruccion" in the word of God.[27]

Similarly, and perhaps more translatable to the issue at hand, when Osiander speaks of those who will prevail against the plague, he points to the faithful and the charitable, as opposed to those who put their whole trust in temporal solutions, including those who "vseth good phisycke." He then qualifies this by saying that these physical solutions can cause either good or evil, and can be used to good effect, if used under the precedence of faith.[28] Here, again, he does not show the two as necessarily contradictory, for one can seek medical prevention while also having faith, and thus the medical prevention can provide good results. Osiander's distinction here is that temporal knowledge is never sure and should be used within the right framework and mindset; it is useful only insofar as it is regarded as subordinate to divine wisdom. We can connect this attitude towards natural philosophy with the theology previously outlined. If so much of Osiander's theology depends on the absolute divinity of Christ's indwelling, by and through which all good works are done, it follows from this that natural philosophy cannot reach divine truths. There is this dichotomy between the natural and the divine, which Osiander deepens in his theology from that of his predecessors.

Before considering the possible motivations for the content of "To the Reader," we must first see why Osiander, as a theologian, would be involved deeply enough in the new sciences to edit and publish such a technical work as *De Revolutionibus*. Osiander gained quite a formidable reputation in Nürnburg for his aptitude and involvement in the astronomical and mathematical circles, a qualification supported by Kepler himself, who acknowledged that Osiander was "most experienced […] in these matters."[29] Indeed, in addition to editing *De Revolutionibus*, the mathematician Hieronymus Cardanus asked Osiander to edit his *Ars Magnus*. Cardanus dedicated not only this work, but also his *De Subtilitate* to Osiander, calling him "most learned Andreas," citing his humanist learning in classical languages, and his "intelligent grasp of mathematics."[30] One scholar attributes this interest in mathematics and natural philosophy to Osiander's calendaric and eschatological interests,[31] which, along with his assertion that Osiander's "interest in science is ancillary to theology,"[32] I find does not treat the issue with due diligence. As evidenced by "To the Reader," Osiander was certainly deeply concerned with the epistemology within which this new natural philosophy is presented.

These epistemological concerns are evident from the beginning of Osiander's involvement with *De Revolutionibus*. According to Kepler, Osiander sent two letters in

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[27] Ibid.

[28] "Marke now then that he sayeth not: Who so is wyse, stronge, ryche, whole, or wel frended. Nether sayeth he also: who so kepeth hymselfe thence, or flyeth thether, holdeth hymselfe well, or vseth good phisycke, but who so putteth hys trust in God. Not that the foresayd good thynges be euell, or maye not be had or vsed wyth profyte: But that they (where fayth is not) may euen assoone do harme as good, are in no wyse able to delyuer from the wrath of God." Ibid., §Bi.

[29] Wrightsman, "Osiander's Contribution," 230; Kepler, *Defense of Tycho*, 151.

[30] Wrightsman, "Osiander's Contribution," 231-2; Graubard, "Lover of Science," 186-7.

[31] Wrightsman, "Osiander's Contribution," 229, 230n35. Wrightsman is referring to Osiander's interest in Cabalistic numerology, as well as his interest in an accurate universal calendar. While I find this claim unconvincing, it is certainly more plausible than the position against which Wrightsman argues, that is, that Osiander's interest stems from an interest in practical astrology.

[32] Ibid, 230n35.

April 1541 to Copernicus and Rheticus, in response to earlier correspondence regarding the editing of *De Revolutionibus*. In these letters, Osiander reveals his personal position on the matter of epistemology to Copernicus, saying, "I have always been of the opinion that hypotheses are not articles of faith, but bases for calculation."[33] He qualifies this position, in this letter and the one to Rheticus, with assurances that such an epistemological position would placate the "peripatetics and theologians" and neutralize any potential objections.[34] Thus, he certainly had an epistemological involvement with this new natural philosophy. Further, as a new form of science, emerging from the Renaissance,[35] these novel investigations offer tantalizing alternatives to the "wasteful work, study, and effort" put in the tired and erroneous Aristotelian natural philosophy.[36] It follows from Osiander's theological alignment with Protestantism that he would seek out and encourage these new studies.[37] Assuming that these epistemological and theological issues have no bearing on Osiander's interest in natural philosophy not only ignores the evidence, but also does a disservice to Osiander himself. As a thoroughgoing theologian and a radical reformer on the heels of Luther, it is virtually unimaginable that he would involve himself in any project without deep considerations for any and every theological aspect thereof.

Accepting that Osiander's general involvement in the emerging natural philosophy was not unconcerned with the theological aspects of the innovations, it follows that "To the Reader" can also not be dismissed without considering Osiander's theological motivations. It seems many have taken Osiander's addition somewhat plainly, assuming that it stems from a concern about potential theological backlash.[38] While this is ostensibly Osiander's motive, we must follow Mark Graubard's conclusion in his paper, "Andreas Osiander: Lover of Science or Appeaser of its Enemies," which succinctly boils down the complex context of "To the Reader" to a single statement: "Osiander spoke his true mind in his preface."[39] It simply cannot be overlooked that

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[33] Kepler, *Defense of Tycho,* 152.

[34] Ibid., 153. Cf. ibid., 152; [Osiander], "To the Reader," 506; Copernicus, "Preface and Dedication," 509.

[35] Osiander himself was educated in the Renaissance Humanist tradition, see Wrightsman, "Osiander's Contribution," 217; Graubard, "Lover of Science," 182.

[36] Luther, "Appeal to the Ruling Class," 470.

[37] Much debated, the full theory of a potential relationship between Protestant, especially Reformed, theology and the rise of modern science is presented in Robert K. Merton *Science, Technology and Society in Seventeenth Century England* (New York: Howard Fertig, 1970), often referred to simply as the 'Merton Thesis.' Though extremely nuanced, and at times problematic, Merton's basic assertion is broadly applicable here. This assertion is that Protestant theology focused on "the study of natural phenomena [as] an effective means for promoting the glory of God" (Ibid., 71), and that "the natural scientist must needs be better equipped than the casual observer to glorify Him […] religion sanctioned science and raised the social estimation of those who pursued scientific investigation, with the associated intensification and spread of interest in such pursuits" (ibid., 72).

Cf. Commission on Theology and Church Relations, *Natural Knowledge of God*, 11; Tom Chirstenson, "On the Outrageous Idea of a Lutheran Epistemology," *Trinity Seminary Review* 27, no.1 (2006): 13-15, EBSCOhost.

For a compilation of contextual and polemical considerations of the Merton Thesis, see I. Bernard Cohen, K. E. Duffin, and Stuart Strickland. *Puritanism and the Rise of Modern Science: The Merton Thesis.* (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1990).

[38] See Kepler, *Defense of Tycho,* 152; Steinmetz, "Renewal of Human Life," 66. Cf. Graubard, "Lover of Science," 170.

[39] Graubard, 187.

Osiander's involvement with *De Revolutionibus* began and ended with this epistemological debate. Kepler's exposition of the correspondence between Osiander, Copernicus, and Rheticus shows that Osiander expressed his concerns at the outset, and cared deeply enough about the issue to conclude his publication of the text with what is essentially an epistemological counterpoint to Copernicus' premise.[40] The continuity of this focus undercuts other assumptions of his intent, and shows that the purpose of "To the Reader" is, necessarily, an epistemological one.

Osiander's insistence on the inclusion of this epistemological qualification belies its importance. As with the rest of his theology, Osiander was particularly stubborn in this context as well.[41] Though apparently receiving a negative reply from Copernicus and Rheticus, and thus in full knowledge of their disagreement, Osiander made the very deliberate choice to append the carefully-worded "To the Reader" onto Copernicus' manuscript. This stubborn purposefulness belies his intent: that this new science, this opportunity for a new basis of thought, be interpreted correctly. If "astronomy can offer us nothing certain,"[42] as it does not stem from divine revelation, it is of utmost importance to the emerging Reformation that such works be presented in this way. Thus, we must not read "To the Reader" as some ignorant, or worse, knowingly false benevolence included by Osiander in order to put off Copernicus' detractors, but we must understand it as Osiander's own evangelism. He was a direct witness to the possibilities of this new science, being the editor of *De Revolutionibus*, and, as a theologian, had a vested interest in its proper interpretation.

It follows, then, that the only way in which we can understand Osiander's "To the Reader" is in the context of his theology. It is crucial to acknowledge that it is primarily a work of epistemology, and, appended to *De Revolutionibus* as such, acts as a commentary thereon. Kepler disparages Osiander's contribution, asking, "If this art [astronomy] knows absolutely nothing of the causes of the heavenly motions, because you believe only what you see, what is to become of medicine?"[43] Here he fundamentally misunderstands the nature of Osiander's epistemology. Osiander himself answered that medicine can be used for human benefit, surely, but must be understood as necessarily inferior in relation to true knowledge, which derives from the divine.[44] It must then follow in the same vein with astronomy. Only in this sense, when we understand "To the Reader" as a work of theological epistemology, can we make sense of Osiander's motivations, and begin to consider his contribution to the Copernican revolution on a wider scale.

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[40] It should be noted that it is a gross oversimplification to characterize "To the Reader" as fraudulent: cf. Edward Rosen, "The Exposure of the Fraudulent Address to the Reader in Copernicus' Revolutions," *The Sixteenth Century Journal* 14, No. 3 (1983): 283-291, doi: 10.2307/2540189; Graubard, "Lover of Science," 177-8. Such accusations rely heavily on the assumption that Osiander's anonymity is intended to appropriate the authority of the author. For a convincing refutation of this assumption, see Wrightsman, "Osiander's Contribution," 233-5.

[41] See note 4 above.

[42] [Osiander], "To the Reader," 506.

[43] Kepler, *Defense of Tycho,* 151.

[44] See note 28 above.

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"Commiseration That May Expel": Theatrical Performance in Marlowe's *Doctor Faustus*

Abstract

This paper examines Christopher Marlowe's Doctor Faustus and asks why Faustus is the only character visibly damned by the end of the play though not the only character that interacts with damning magic. It engages typical contemporary critical responses to Faustus that blame the title character's damnation on either predestination or ambition, along with historical data involving the antitheatrical debate of the late sixteenth and early to mid seventeenth centuries. By considering the role of performance in Marlowe's Faustus, this paper argues that Faustus' audiences are not damned because of the power of theatrical performance. Doctor Faustus demonstrates the way in which theater is able to educate the audience while acting as an intermediary that shields the audience from the sinful thing that they desire. In this way, this paper claims that Marlowe's play functions as a protheatrical attempt to vindicate and justify the value of theater.

Contemporary criticism has explained Doctor Faustus's damnation as either the portrayal of the character's predestined damned state or the result of his unregulated pursuit of knowledge.[1] In attempting to understand the cause of Faustus's damnation, these critics have overlooked the role of theatrical performance in Christopher Marlowe's play. The instances of performance within the play, such as Faustus's magic performance for the secondary characters or the servants' imitation of Faustus's necromantic readings, demonstrate the play's departure from questions of Protestant predestination, the threat an unregulated humanist pursuit of knowledge poses to religion. Instead, instances of performance show the intermediary power of theatre. Rather than asking why Faustus is damned at the end of the play, I ask why the characters that interact with Faustus's magic and ask to see that magic performed are not similarly damned. This paper uses close reading of the text and a historicist approach that engages both protheatricalism and anti-theatricalism to investigate the ways in which *Doctor Faustus* demonstrates theater's power to educate.

As a play that depicts blasphemous content, *Doctor Faustus* is congruent with both anti-theatrical and protheatrical criticism of the late sixteenth and early to mid-seventeenth century.[2] Extreme Puritan anti-theatricalism attacked the theaters as "churches of the Devil" and loci for sin.[3] Indeed, authors such as Anthony Munday,

[1] Douglas Cole, *Suffering and Evil in the Plays of Christopher Marlowe* (New York: Gordian Press, 1972), 200. And J.W. Smeed, *Faust in Literature* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1975), 90.
[2] Irving Ribner, *Complete Play* (New York: Odyssey Press, 1963), xviii.
[3] Jeffrey Knapp, *Shakespeare's Tribe: Church, Nation, and Theater in Renaissance England* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002), 5-9.

Stephen Gosson, and John Northbrooke criticized theater at its late-sixteenth century height as a heretical space in which the word of God was profaned.[4] This criticism against the theater culminated in 1633 with William Prynne's *Histriomastix*. In Prynne's consideration of Christianity, Christians

> *…should be, Saints; yea, Chaste, and holy Virgins, Temples, and Vessels for the Lord: cleansing themselves from all pollution, both of Flesh, and Spirit: stopping their ears from hearing blood, shutting their eyes from seeing evil: yea, not so much, as touching any unclean thing: therefore they must abandon all Unchaste, all Scurrilous, and filthy thin*gs.[5]

Prynne demonstrates the explicitly religious argument these anti-theatrical tracts assumed. If the theater is a "filthy," "unclean," and "scurrilous" entity, then plays are something that not only display evil but were actual sources of evil that could corrupt a pure soul. Therefore, many leaders of the Anglican Church and Puritan preachers engaged anti-theatricalism to warn Christians against the "vile, and odious sine" embedded in theatrical performance.[6]

However, Jeffrey Knapp's *Shakespeare's Tribe* challenges the view that all sixteenth-century Church authorities condemned theater as immoral. He claims that many plays, playwrights, and godly men considered theater as having positive social and moral effects.[7] Knapp's account works to vindicate early modern theater as an act that functioned congruently with religious sermons to caution the audience against sin by presenting the art as a type of parable.[8] If we read Marlowe's play in terms of Knapp's protheatrical argument, plays with offensive content such as *Doctor Faustus* are not dangerous in their portrayal of sin, but didactic. By witnessing Faustus's damnation, the audience learns not to indulge in Faustus's sins. However, reading Faustus exclusively through a traditionally protheatrical lens does not provide an answer as to why Faustus remains the only character on stage that is explicitly damned by the end of the play. The secondary characters that ask to witness and even attempt to perform magic should face the same damning consequences for their desires, but they remain undammed by the end of the play.

Considering performance as the ultimate mediator offers a potential solution to this problem. Performance allows the audience, both on stage and in the theater, to indulge in a potentially sinful experience while protecting them from the repercussions of that experience. The performance of sin functions as an intermediary that shields the audience from the sinful thing that they desire to know. It works as a godly enterprise that teaches the audience a lesson, but does not caution the audience against the sin that they desire to know. Instead, performance allows the audience to empathetically indulge in sin without directly engaging in the sinful action. In exploring the ways in which performance mitigates the experience of sin, this paper seeks to understand Marlowe's play as a different kind of protheatrical attempt to justify the value of theater.

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[4] Knapp, *Shakespeare's Tribe*, 7.
[5] William Prynne, *Histriomastix* (London: E.A. & W, 1633), 63.
[6] Knapp, *Shakespeare's Tribe*, 10; quotation from Prynne, *Histriomastix*, 63.
[7] Knapp, *Shakespeare's Tribe*, 9.
[8] Knapp, *Shakespeare's Tribe*, 2.

Performance as a Mediator

The idea for Doctor Faustus arises from a classic German legend that was translated into English in 1587.[9] Known to be Marlowe's original source text, *The English Faust Book* sends an explicitly Protestant message that cautions against immoral actions. In the original text, Faustus's immoral behavior is a direct result of an innately bad mind and corrupt soul. He rejects learning and knowledge, especially theological learning, in exchange for necromancy because he is "of a naughty mind and otherwise addicted."[10] The original story introduces Faustus as a type of mischievous and manipulative devil whose role is to corrupt the other characters by exposing them to necromancy. However, the Faustus of Marlowe's adaptation seems to lack this innate corruption. Marlowe explores the character's internal reasoning and motivation to rationalize Faustus's turn to magic in terms other than predestined corruption.[11] In this sense, the audience is granted direct access to Faustus's mind. Marlowe establishes an empathetic connection between the audience and Faustus so that they can vicariously experience what happens to Faustus on stage. Thus, Faustus's actions and thoughts become a way in which the audience can explore their questions or desires.

Faustus is able to fulfill the desires of his audience on stage with his performance, which means that the audience does not need to physically engage in the sin that they desire. In Scene 9, when Faustus interacts with Emperor Carolus the Fifth, the emperor's passivity in watching the performance shields him from the potential repercussions of his desire. The emperor tells Faustus that he has heard far and wide about the man's magical ability before asking him to "see some proof of thy skill, that mine eyes may be witnesses to confirm what mine ears have heard reported" (9.5-9).[12] The emperor's desire to "see," "to perceive" (*OED* 1a) "with insight" (*OED* 1b) the magic he has heard about suggests a desire for knowledge. Unlike Faustus, who wants the power to perform magic, the emperor asks to gain insight or knowledge about his ancestors through the passive act of witnessing Faustus's performance of the magic on his behalf. In turn, Faustus is actively "…by art and power of my spirit … able to perform" (9.36-37). While "spirit" here could refer to Faustus's own soul, it also references the spirit, Mephastophilis, whom Faustus commands. When the emperor asks Faustus to perform, he inadvertently asks Mephastophilis to perform. Nonetheless, it is the inadvertent nature of this request that saves the emperor from the repercussions of commanding the demon to perform. Faustus acts as a physical intermediary between the passive emperor and the damning power of

[9] Anonymous, *The English Faust Book.* Ed. John Henry Jones (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994).
[10] *Ibid*, 92.
[11] Douglas Cole, *Christopher Marlowe and the Renaissance of Tragedy* (London: Greenwood Press, 1995), 124.
[12] Marlowe, Christopher. "The Tragical History of Doctor Faustus," *The Norton Anthology of English Literature: The Sixteenth Century and the Early Seventeenth Century Volume B*, Stephen Greenblatt, ed., 1127-1163 (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 2012). All following quotes from *Doctor Faustus* will be taken from this Norton edition.

magic. Though his desire is fulfilled and Faustus is able to raise the emperor's kin from the dead, the emperor is not damned because the performance mediates the emperor's interaction with the devil. The act of passively watching the performance serves as a shield between the emperor and his potential damnation.

As both the play's audience and the audience watching the performance within the play watch passively, the passivity that mediates between the emperor and his desires is the same passivity that protects the audience watching the stage. The Chorus introduces the emperor's scene with a description of the palace, Faustus's fame, and his magical journey around the world. However, the Chorus intentionally leaves the actual performance of magic for the audience to both witness and imagine: "What there he did in trial of his art / I leave untold: your eyes shall see performed" (16-17). The "what" that introduces the line adds a level of ambiguity to the demonstration. *What* Faustus will perform is left up to the audience to decide. Faustus's performance therefore becomes something collaborative; it is both the physical action onstage and what the audience projects on to the performance. In other words, the audience is invited to take an active role in interpreting the action on stage, which should mean that they are physically participating in the sin. However, like the emperor, the act of watching or witnessing implies passivity: they do not embroil themselves in the magic but merely witness it. Therefore, Faustus's performance, both within the play for the emperor and on the stage for the theater's audience, is able to present potentially sinful experiences without the audience having to directly interact with these sins.

Following this logic, all the characters involved in the performance on the stage would then be damned because they are not passive observers but active participants in the performance of sin. However, the performance can also be seen as an intermediary that translates sinful action into an unreal space where it becomes innocuous. This is illustrated by the servants, who should ostensibly be damned for their attempt to read Faustus's necromantic books. The attempt to perform the words acts as a shield that stands between the speakers and the consequences of their actions.[13] Like Faustus, Robin invokes the magic book so it will serve his purposes: "I ha' stolen one of Doctor Faustus's conjuring books, and I'faith I mean to search some circles for my own use" (6.1-2). Yet when Rafe challenges, "Thou [Robin] canst not read!" (6.12-13), Robin's performance of the words is exposed a mere imitation of his master's use of magic. Therefore, when Robin attempts to use the book's words to curse Vintner in Scene 8, he imitates Faustus's use of the spell books rather than actually reproducing the words. Because Robin can only imitate his master, he remains one step removed from the actual action. The false Dog Latin that Robin uses prevents him from actually possessing magical power for his own purposes. Imitating the words becomes a type of mediation that invalidates his performance. Robin's performance becomes a pantomime of the sinful words on the page, which makes the potentially dangerous use of the words safe. Robin's poor performance of Latin, then, does not generate the experiences or the

[13] I use the content of the 1604 version of the Servant's scenes because the authorship of the 1616 version is debated. Evidence that William Birde and Samuel Rowley were paid in 1602 by theater manager Henslowe to "add to the play," makes it questionable that the playwright himself constructed the extended comic scenes present in the 1616 version. See Douglas Cole, *Christopher Marlowe and the Renaissance of Tragedy.*

consequences Faustus accrues when he interacts with magic because it imitates rather than replicates the actual experience of damning magical power.

In contrast to the servants' ignorant illiteracy, Faustus's ability to read Latin and quote famous doctrines from memory demonstrates his exceptional education. Therefore, Faustus's misrepresentation of doctrines is an intentionally slothful reading. Sloth, being unable or unwilling to fully read or understand a passage, demonstrates a moral failing because it signifies one's inability to self-discipline.[14] Faustus's fallacious readings of classic philosophy and biblical texts become a way in which Faustus dismisses the indirect interaction with sin that protects the servants in exchange for direct interaction with his desires. Faustus's reading of classic philosophy is a perversion of the Aristotelian argument: "Is to dispute well logic's chiefest end? / Affords this art no greater miracle?" (1.8-9). The translation of the Latin text in the footnotes reads, "To carry on a disputation well is the end of logic."[15] While the translation emphasizes the act of carrying on the argument, continually engaging in a debate, Faustus's version does not represent this progression. He entirely omits the idea of "carrying on" a debate and suggests that the end of philosophy is to debate for the sake of debating. This causes him to abandon his studies all together, to "read no more" (1.10). As Faustus misinterprets the Aristotelian philosophy, he believes that his ability to "dispute well" means he has mastered this art and allows him to "read no more." His erroneous reading of Aristotle's point serves as an excuse to reject books and the passive education he could receive from them.

Similarly, Faustus's misquotation and then misinterpretation of the Bible demonstrates a desire to discredit and dismiss learning by example. He quotes Romans 6.23 but omits the second half of the verse, "but the gift of God is eternal life through Jesus Christ our Lord" which causing his skeptical response, "the reward of sin is death?" (1.40).[16] Faustus's bad reading of the biblical verse causes him to question Christian doctrine and the validity of faith. In Faustus's conception, God has no mercy or divine forgiveness; he offers nothing more than death. Because Faustus omits the doctrine's promise that God will reward with eternal life those who follow His tenants, he turns to magic because he believes it will offer a direct world "of power, of honor, of omnipotence" (1.54). Faustus opts to pursue a field that gravitates away from passive reading and contemplation towards a world in which he would have direct physical power.[17]

Faustus's inability to heed verbal warnings, interpret examples, or learn passively from books indicates that his damnation comes from his direct physical participation in sinful action. Upon signing his soul away to the Devil, Faustus demands knowledge about spells and incantations, the planets and the heavens, and plants and herbs in the

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[14] Joseph McCullen, "Dr. Faustus and Renaissance Learning," *The Modern Language Review*, Vol. 51, no. 1 (1956): 8.

[15] Stephen Greenblatt, Footnote 3 in *The Norton Anthology of English Literature: The Sixteenth Century and the Early Seventeenth Century Volume B*, version of Christopher Marlowe's "The Tragical History of Doctor Faustus," (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 2012), 1129.

[16] Romans 6.23 as quoted in Stephen Greenblatt, Footnote 2 in *The Norton Anthology of English Literature: The Sixteenth Century and the Early Seventeenth Century Volume B*, version of Christopher Marlowe's "The Tragical History of Doctor Faustus," (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 2012), 1130.

[17] Cole, *Christopher Marlowe and the Renaissance of Tragedy*, 49.

form of books. But when Mephastophilis gives him the books, Faustus rejects them as false. Though Mephastophilis assures Faustus that the books represent the knowledge he requested, Faustus rejects the books as a mere approximation to the knowledge he could behold: "When I behold the heavens, then I repent, / And curse thee, wicked Mephastophilis, / Because thou hast deprived me of those joys" (5.177-179). To behold, "To hold or keep in view (implying active voluntary exercise of the faculty of vision)" (*OED* 7a) signifies an active participation in witnessing something. By asking to "behold" the heavens, Faustus rejects Mephastophilis' books and asks to experience that which he cannot passively learn from the books alone. Faustus's damnation, then, is a result of his direct physical participation in sinful experience.

Faustus then teaches the audience a double lesson: he allows them to experience their sins vicariously through passively watching the performance and warns them against directly engaging the sins. Because Faustus's fallacious reading of doctrine would be immediately recognized as specious by a Renaissance audience, the audience would be able to see the direct experience of sin as the cause of Faustus's damnation and learn through example to avoid direct experience. That is to say, the performance acts as both a deterrent from pursuing sin in the real world and a way in which to safely indulge in sin.

Faustus in Context: Protestant and Humanist Critiques of the Play

Typical responses to *Doctor Faustus* regard physical interaction with magic as a sign of, rather than cause of, the character's damnation. Magic is seen as an indication of either his predestined condemnation or his ambitious unregulated pursuit of knowledge.[18] These critical responses engage a historical debate in order to explain Faustus's turn to magic and subsequent damnation. Though I will argue a third explanation for Faustus's damnation, it will be helpful to track how the traditional readings function in order to determine why these explanations are insufficient; as they focus exclusively on Faustus's fate instead of considering all aspects of the play, namely the role of performance.

In a humanist critique of Protestantism, Faustus's despair over his predestined damnation is cited as the reason the character turns to necromancy. In his first monologue, Faustus argues that if sin is the cause of damnation, then the religious doctrine is unfair because man is innately sinful: "If we say we have no sin / We deceive ourselves […] Ay, we must die an everlasting death. / What doctrine call you this? / […] Divinity, adieu!" (1.42-48). Faustus denounces religion as unjust because man is condemned his innate fallen nature. In challenging the biblical passage and questioning doctrine, Faustus demonstrates that he does not have faith and is a member of the non-elect, therefore innately damned.[19] Critics have used this evidence to support the idea that

[18] Douglas Cole, *Suffering and Evil in the Plays of Christopher Marlowe* (New York: Gordian Press, 1972). 256.

[19] See, John Calvin, "The Institutes of the Christian Religion," *The Protestant Reformation,* Hans J. Hillerband, ed. (New York: Harper Perennial, 2009), 220. Calvinism asserts that there no way in which to know if one is a member of the elect or a member of the non-elect, actions become the only way to determine one's fate: those who are saved will demonstrate faith, good deeds, and piety while the damned will act without faith.

the play is a humanist critique of Protestantism. If magic represents Faustus's destructive whole-hearted pursuit of forbidden thought, the play becomes a humanist critique of Protestantism, in which a man who has no control over his fate turns to magic in order to distract himself.[20]

While his involvement in necromancy can be seen as a form of distraction from his predestined internal damnation, critics have used Faustus's negative presentations of medicine, theology, and law to suggest that his pursuit of magic is motivated by a thirst for knowledge rather than despair over his fate. Faustus tries to gain God's knowledge about the world because human pursuits can only offer him limited power. Faustus's damnation is therefore a result of the character's runaway greed and thirst for knowledge.[21] If Faustus's pursuit of magic is read as a way in which the main character attempts to intellectualize his mortality, his knowledge can be seen as a type of perverse Humanism. In trying to control his fate, in trying to know that which man is not meant to know, Faustus damns himself. However, because Faustus's knowledge is based on "limited and defective knowledge," he misinterprets humanist doctrine, and rather than trying to redeem his fallen nature with culture, tries to become God.[22] Much like the fall of Lucifer, Faustus falls when tries to achieve power that man was not meant to have, in this case magical power.[23] Therefore, in reading Faustus's pursuit of magic as a perversion of humanist philosophy, critics interpret the play as presentation of Protestant fear about the unregulated attempt to elevate oneself with culture; a Protestant critique of Humanism that contemplates what could happen with runaway humanist ideology.[24]

Physical Experience and the Mediation of Performance

While these critics point to magic as the source of Faustus's damnation, I propose an alternative explanation: Faustus must physically experience the knowledge he desires in order to learn. As William Perkins claims, "In philosophy we first see a thing true by experience, and afterward give our assent unto it."[25] Because Faustus is a philosopher he requires proof in order to accept something as true. However, the problem with needing to experience rather than simply accept something as true, is that experience removes the need for faith. [26] To be a Christian is to trust in that which one cannot experience; Perkins asserts that "we must consent to the word of God, resisting all doubt and

[20] Ibid, 250.
[21] Michael Hattaway, "The Theology of Marlowe's *Doctor Faustus*," *Renaissance Drama,* Vol. 3 (1970): 51-78. p. 56.
[22] Margaret O'Brien, "Christian Belief in Doctor Faustus," *ELH*, no. 1 (1970):.3. And Joseph McCullen, "Dr. Faustus and Renaissance Learning," 8.
[23] O'Brien, "Christian Belief in Doctor Faustus," 3.
[24] J.W. Smeed, *Faust in Literature*, 90.
[25] William Perkins, *The Golden Chain.* (Cambridge: John Legat Through the University of Cambridge, 1600), 119.
[26] Ibid, 119. Perkins highlights the importance of the "practice of faith" in contrast to the proof required by philosophical contemplation.

diffidence, and afterward will an experience, and feeling of comfort follow."[27] Perkins uses "faith" to define a Christian as one who must resist all misgivings, all questions. He builds on Luther's claim that one can justify one's salvation only by faith, God's grace, and on the basis of scripture.[28] That Faustus cannot simply accept Mephastophilis' words or existence as proof of Hell demonstrates his inability to have faith or trust in symbols. Instead, Faustus must physically experience Hell in order to accept that Hell exists. Faustus's damnation can therefore be seen as a result of his inability to believe, his need for experience rather than simple interaction with magic. Faustus, unable to excite his mind with conceptual educational pursuits that lack tangible proof, must gain knowledge by experience rather than example.

This causes Faustus to be unable to learn vicariously or by example and ironically prevents him from understanding the divine mysteries for which he sold his soul. When Faustus asks Mephastophilis to reveal the location and nature of Hell, he does not gain any knowledge from the demon's answers because he doubts what he hears. Faustus counters Mephastophilis' claims about Hell's location and miserable conditions as mere "old wives' tales" (5.133). Though Mephastophilis tells him "I am an instance to prove the contrary: / For I am damned, and am now in hell" (5.134-136), Faustus cannot have faith in Hell's existence. Mephastophilis turns himself into a metaphor that makes Hell undeniably real. Mephastophilis becomes the text upon which Faustus should read the reality of Hell. Though the demon stands as an "instance," an "example brought forward in support of a general assertion or an argument, or in illustration of a general truth" (*OED* 6a), Faustus refuses to accept the metaphorical example as proof. Faustus takes the words literally, challenging the demon: "Now in hell? Nay, and this be hell, I'll willingly be damned here!" (5.137-138). He cannot translate the words into a metaphorical space that would make them meaningful. He is unable read the text properly because he omits all symbolic meaning from Mephastophilis' words. If Mephastophilis is the mediator to Faustus's knowledge, a metaphorical "book" that stands between actual experience and understanding, than his mediation becomes a way in which to *deprive* Faustus of real knowledge. Only by directly physically experiencing the knowledge he desires, would Faustus be able to accept the reality of Hell, reject Mephastophilis and repent. This need to directly experience the knowledge he desires rather than passively learn by example or instruction is the cause of Faustus's damnation.

It follows then that all physical interaction with sin should cause one's damnation. However the example of the Duchess in Scene 12 demonstrates that a performance's mimetic nature has the power to negate even physical interaction with and participation in sin as it renders the action unreal. When Faustus's magical performance for the Duke and the Duchess in scene 11 fails to excite the Duchess, her response that "I would desire no better meat than a dish of ripe grapes" (12.10) suggests that her problem with the magic lies in its demonstrative quality; she would rather experience a magical indulgence than see the magic performed. Faustus responds to her request with "Alas madam, that's nothing! Mephastophilis, begone!" (12.11). While Faustus still acts as a mediator between the woman's desires and the devil who fulfills these desires, the Duchess is

[27] Ibid.

[28] Martin Luther, "The Freedom of a Christian." *The Protestant Reformation*, edited by Hans J. Hillerbrand, 31-58. (New York: Harper Perennial, 2009), 33.

neither simply a passive watcher nor an imitator. In eating the grapes, the Duchess physically indulges in her sin.

Yet she is not explicitly damned by this action, and the reason for her safety can be seen in the theatricality with which she accepts her indulgence. When the Duchess tastes the grapes she exclaims: "they be the best grapes that ere I tasted in my life before." (24-25). Her exclamation has the hyperbolic effect of theatrical expression: she tastes the grapes and tells the audience of their flavor, acting out her experience so that the audience can taste the grapes through her experience. She translates the physical, the actual act of eating the grapes, into a performance in a theatrical space, thus removing the reality from the action. The performance removes the substance, the texture, from the experience, transforming the action into another innocuous imitation of actual sin. In externalizing her internal experience, the Duchess shields both the audience and herself from the reality of this act and its potential consequences.

Commiseration and the Function of Performance

If performance renders all sinful experiences unreal and therefore innocuous, Faustus's damnation at the end of the play creates a conundrum. As a performer, Faustus's sinful actions should be vindicated by his performance for the play's audience in the same way the Duchess' sins are erased by her performance. However, Faustus never gains redemption. A possible reason for this conundrum is offered by the Old Man's dismissal of "commiseration" at the end of the play. The Old Man enters to convince Faustus to turn back to God with repentant tears. Though Faustus believes that there is nothing he can do to save himself, the Old Man argues: "With such flagitious crimes of heinous sins, / As no commiseration may expel / But mercy, Faustus, of they savior sweet" (34-36).[29] In Lutheran theology, good deeds or "works" are discredited as viable means to expel heinous sins. Luther argues that since one can only save one's self by the justification of faith in God, "the work never makes the worker like itself"[30] and therefore physical actions have no effect on salvation. However, here, the Old Man replaces this idea of "work" with the word "commiseration," "to express sympathy with, condole with" (*OED* 2). Commiseration invokes an external response of a spectator, implying a relationship between the sympathy of the audience witnessing Faustus's fall and Faustus's fate. The speech explicitly discredits the idea that the empathy generated by the performance could save the character from damnation, as only the mercy of God can redeem him.

While the play is concerned with Faustus's fate and the choices that led to his damnation, the objective of performance within the play is not to save the title character

[29] I am using the 1604 version of Marlowe's tragedy for the content of the Old Man's speech. As I am considering the role of theater in Faustus and the way in which this role interacts with the audience, this version of the text better illustrates my point. In the 1604 version, the "commiseration" mentioned in the Old Man's speech implies a wide audience, whereas in the 1616 version his use of "pity" comes from a personal place: the Old Man "pities" Faustus making the commensuration in the revised version of the speech applicable only to the speaker rather than implicating the entire audience.

[30] Martin Luther, "The Freedom of a Christian," 46.

though commiseration or repentance, but rather to save the audience through theatrical exposure to sin. Turning back to examine the outcome of servants' experience with magic, the theater can be seen as a didactic space that both satisfies and expunges sinful desires. Because he lacks education, Robin can only approximate the experience he covets with performance. However, this experience is still able to satisfy his desire in a way that effectively eliminates it. When Robin fails to read Faustus's books and speaks in Dog Latin, Mephastophilis appears and shoots firecrackers at Robin and Rafe. They immediately run around the stage and lapse into prayers to God begging the Lord to have mercy on their souls. Their brief exposure to the magic causes them to fully repent, fully return to religion, saying, "Have mercy on us!" (8.30) in Latin and promising to "never rob thy [the devil's] library more" (8.31). Mephastophilis punishes the servants in a way that fits their crime; their punishment is only a threat of pain rather than actual damnation.[31] As opposed to Faustus who can ignore verbal warnings about the reality of Hell and damnation, the servants are actually exposed to an innocuous version of Hell's punishment as a result of their performance. The performance satisfies their curiosity by literally exposing them to their desire, but it also eliminates the servant's curiosity and banishes all thoughts the servants may have of involving themselves in magic again. Thus because the performance allows the servants to explore their desire in an unreal theatrical space, the performance serves as a didactic experience: they are exposed to their ambitions in a way that renders these desires suddenly unappealing. Commiseration then does not work to save the title character, but to create an empathetic link between the audience and the action on the stage so that they might learn through the experiences they witness and vicariously undergo. Faustus remains damned because the play asks not to expel "heinous sins" but rather to vicariously indulge in the heinous sins presented. In other words, Faustus is damned so that the audience need not be.

Conclusion: A Protheatrical Explanation of the Doctor's Damnation

In a chapter of *The Renaissance Self-Fashioning,* entitled "Marlowe and the Will to Absolute Play," Stephen Greenblatt argues that when Marlowe's characters flaunt social norms and rules by embracing their self-involved goals, they simultaneously undermine the social rules and reinforce them. Greenblatt demonstrates this ironic usage of Protestantism in the motif of repetition throughout Marlowe's play. As the church used repetition of prayers to create "God-fearing, obedient subjects," a play's repetition of words, structures or actions could symbolize an attempt to educate the characters on

[31] It is unclear the extent to which Mephastophilis actually punishes the servants. He claims to "transform" them into a dog and an ape, but the servants seem confused about which animal they have become: "How into an ape?" (8.45) "I must be a dog" (8.47) suggesting that the transformation is not a physical transformation but a metaphorical threat. Even if it is a physical change, it is a comical punishment far from damnation by which the servants seem unperturbed: "I'll have fine sport with the boys; I'll get nuts and apples enow" (8.45-46). I consider the firecracker punishment because it explicitly punishes the servants physically.

stage.[32] However, *Doctor Faustus* seems to mock this repetitive efficacy: Faustus repeatedly states his goals while the secondary characters reiterate his damnation and caution him to repent. The repetition symbolic of religious education exists in the play, yet the title character learns nothing. Instead of cautioning the audience against Faustus's actions, the "blasphemy pays homage to the power it insults," meaning that Faustus's transgression ironically sends a Protestant message by defying the Protestant God.[33] But the blasphemy could also be seen as reinforcing the power it undermines. Since Faustus's fate is determined within the initial scenes of the play, the meantime between the acknowledgement of Faustus's damnation and the physical condemnation, works to serve the audience's desires: the audience wills Faustus to continue performing and therefore identifies with the character in order to vicariously live through the action on stage.[34] Faustus's damnation works to reify the status quo of religion, order, and social cohesion because it allows for safe indulgence in that which is contrary to the power it attacks. It allows for disruption in an unreal theatrical space so that the audience need not indulge in the same disruption outside the theatrical space. Therefore, in undermining the religious or social power on stage, the play reinforces the power outside the theater.

In this way, theater becomes a space in which performance allows the audience to empathize with characters as they undergo sinful experiences. As actors translate these potentially sinful actions into an unreal theatrical space, the audience experiences their desires without substance and therefore without the threat of consequences. The theater is didactic in the sense that it is cathartic, leaving audience members more pure and less likely to sin than a moral lesson or verbal warning ever could. The function of Marlowe's play, then, is to challenge the popular Renaissance belief that theater was a sinful venue with little redeeming value. If this play presents theater's didactic function, then it argues that plays are not the locus for sin they were rumored to be, but rather a way in which the population may expunge their immoral desires and become less likely to commit sin.

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[32] Stephen Greenblatt, "Marlowe and the Will to Absolute Play," *Renaissance Self-Fashioning.* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980), 201.
[33] Ibid,212.
[34] Ibid, 216. In analyzing the *Jew of Malta* Greenblatt claims a link between the dying Barabas and the audience, claiming the character recovers because the audiences wills him to do so. The tangible link that perpetuates a character's performance is applicable to *Faustus* as it explains the existence of the scenes in the middle of the play.

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Oblivion as a Narrative of Transformation in Plato's *Phaedrus*

Abstract

In Platonic theory, the act of forgetting is often portrayed as a negative, self-destructive phenomenon and as the antithesis of recollection (anamnesis). The Phaedrus, however, with the breadth of its discussion, uniquely features many distinct types of forgetting, whose resulting states of oblivion are not always detrimental to the soul. On the contrary, forms of oblivion serve to craft the outlines of the philosopher's memory, which must be reconstituted through rhetorically imaging the soul and dialectically discovering truths. In this essay, I question the simplicity of defining Plato's oblivion as the failed state of soul's recollection, and instead argue that oblivion encompasses a necessary series of transformations, which progressively enable the soul to regain the knowledge within itself. Using the ideas in Marc Augé's 1998 essay Les formes de l'oubli as a framework, I collect and divide the instances of oblivion in the Phaedrus into four distinct transformations—base, return, suspense, and rebeginning—that create a narrative of the philosopher's pursuit of knowledge, thereby bringing the wide-reaching ideas of Socrates and Phaedrus into unity.

The language of memory (μνήμη), recollection (ἀνάμνησις), and oblivion (λήθη) is pervasive throughout Plato's *Phaedrus*. Indeed, the pastoral conversation begins with Phaedrus' denial of having memorized a speech by Lysias (228a3 ἀπομνημονεύσειν), climaxes at Socrates' *mythos* of the philosopher's remembrance (249d ἀναμιμνησκόμενος),and ends with the pair's characterization of writing as a reminder (278a2 ὑπόμνησιν).[1] It may initially seem that the content of Socrates' great speech, which associates the *Phaedrus* with the *Meno* and *Phaedo* through its utilization of Plato's theory of recollection, makes the motivic insistence of forgetting and reminding an unremarkable stylistic device. However, it is the dialogue's breadth and varying representations of oblivion in epistemology, *eros*, mythology, and discourse that suggest a differentiation of oblivion in the *Phaedrus* from oblivion in other Platonic works. This essay characterizes the four transformations of oblivion—base, return, suspense, and rebeginning[2]—that are unique to the *Phaedrus*. Their construction of a narrative dimension, in which the philosopher rediscovers the Forms through an incremental process initiated by erotic love, provides support for the *Phaedrus*' unity, the debate over which has lasted for centuries.[3]

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[1] All translations of Plato are my own. They are based on Harvey Yunis' *Phaedrus* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011) and John Burnet's *Meno*, *Theaetetus*, and *Republic* (*Platonis Opera*, Oxford University Press, 1903).

[2] See Marc Augé, *Oblivion*, trans. Marjolijn de Jager (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2004), 56-57.

[3] See Hermias of Alexandria (5th century CE), *Hermiae Alexandrini in Platonis Phaedrum scholia* (Paris, É. Bouillon: 1901), 8-10 ("Δόξαι τοῦ σκοποῦ") for the commentary on all the various opinions concerning the main topic of the dialogue. See also Malcolm Heath and Christopher J. Rowe's discussion in *OSAP* 7 (1989), 151-188.

With its "allegory of the chariot," a mythological portrayal of humanity's oblivion and recollection of the Forms (τὰ ὄντα), the *Phaedrus* uses vivid imagery to make it clear that wingless oblivion is decreed by Destiny to be an undesirable, unfortunate outcome:

> Whichever [winged] soul, having become a companion to a god, that obtains a view of any one of the true things (τῶν ἀληθῶν) is unharmed until the next period, and if it is always able to do this, it is always unharmed; but whenever it does not see any one of the true things because it was unable to follow, and having been filled by some accident with both forgetfulness (λήθης) and evil, it is weighed down (βαρυνθῇι), and having grown heavy (βαρυνθεῖσα), it both sheds its wings and falls to earth… (248c)

The oblivious soul is heavy (a fact emphasized by the repetition of the aorist passive of βαρύνω), wingless, and no longer close to the divine. By definition, it can no longer see the true things, which are equivalent etymologically to things that are not forgotten (ἀ-λήθεια) and conceptually to the Forms. Oblivion here on earth is therefore in every sense a *base* state, an energetic minimum that takes at least three thousand years of philosophy to overcome (249a).

The mechanism of the soul's transformation (or perhaps deformation) to this state centers on the wings, which are metaphors for remembrance. Souls that took part in the divine procession were eager to see where the plain of truth is, because "the nature of the wing, by which the soul is lightened, is nourished by [its pasturage]" (248b6-c2). However, those with incompetent charioteers are crippled by the traffic disorder, and "many wings break with respect to much of their plumage. And having great toil, all of them leave uninitiated in the vision of Reality, and having left, they use opinion (δοξαστῆι) as nourishment" (248b3-5). With these passages, Socrates narrates a process by which a soul becomes malnourished by false opinions and, with its crippled, broken wings, increasingly at risk for "some accident." In other words, the wingless oblivion of humanity is—instead of a sudden, calamitous event—a degeneration resulting from the inability to see (and thus the gradual forgetting of) the Forms. Oblivion is therefore not just a base state, not just the negative of the divine-level state in which the soul used to be, but also a dramatized transformation of the soul's wasting away.

To recover from this wasted state, a soul must practice philosophy through dialectic in order to recollect the Forms and regrow its wings. Yet even in this process of remembering, there is mention of forgetting and neglecting as necessary actions for ascension. When a human soul was traveling with god, it "disregarded (ὑπεριδοῦσα) the things we now say are real and lifted up its head to that which is truly real instead" (249c3). In mimicry of that, a soul that begins to recollect from an image of beauty here on earth, reminded of true beauty (τοῦ ἀληθοῦς ἀναμιμνησκόμενος), tries to fly up and "looks upward like a bird, without care (ἀμελῶν) for the things down below" (249d7). While carelessness and disregard are not synonyms for forgetfulness, the translation of this neglect into action is where oblivion comes in. For Plato in the *Theaetetus* describes memory as a waxen surface that has variable elasticity and is imprinted by perceptions (ταῖς αἰσθήσεσι... ἀποτυποῦσθαι), preserving traces in the mind (*Theae.* 191d). Without dialectic, these traces in a pre-philosophical soul may likely be formulated into false opinions that hinder the search for truth. It is therefore necessary for a philosopher to

disregard these earthly traces, to forget the ideas and opinions shaped in the wax, and to rely instead on the *winged* memory that, for philosophers, is sufficiently present (*Phdr.* 250a5 ἱκανῶς πάρεστιν) but must be regrown. In other words (and in connection to what is upcoming), what is *written* in the wax during our present time must be forgotten, and what is still *present* inside our soul from the past must be reminded and recollected.[4]

To clarify my point that the philosopher's oblivion of the present time is a necessary component of recollection, I will now bring in Marc Augé's "figures of oblivion" from his 1998 essay *Les formes de l'oubli*. Augé, a French ethnographer, does not mention the *Phaedrus* by name in his essay, but his divisions of oblivion are so applicable to the Platonic dialogue that they provide a neat framework for my argument. First, it is important to specify my working definition of oblivion: "What we forget is not the thing itself, the 'pure and simple' events as they happened (the 'diegesis,' in the language of semioticians), but the remembrance" (Augé 16-17). It is clear how Plato's Chariot Allegory is in line with this. The Forms are in fact always accessible, able to be evoked by reminders here on earth such as beauty, but the shedding of our wings mirrors the loss of our remembrance.

Augé uses this definition of oblivion to investigate "the narrative dimension of every existence," and his ethnographic work takes him to the issue of time dimensions within rites.

> No dimension of time can be thought about by forgetting the others, and rites are exemplary of the tension between memory and expectation that characterizes the present, to the extent that it organizes the passage from a before to an after, of which it is at once the interpreter and the landmark. Three 'figures' or forms of oblivion can be seen in certain rites that I shall qualify as emblematic for this reason. (55; underlines are mine)

Augé defines the first figure as "that of the *return*, whose first ambition is to find a lost past again by forgetting the present—as well as the immediate past with which it tends to be confused—in order to reestablish a continuity with the older past, to eliminate the 'compound' past to the advantage of a 'simple' past" (55). One can see how the soul's recollection through dialectic fits this idea of the "oblivion of the present" well.

The philosopher's oblivion of the present is a transformation that separates it from the multitude's oblivion that was earlier associated with baseness and waste; he who "is rebuked by the many as being disturbed, but being possessed by a god, has escaped their notice (λέληθε τοὺς πόλλους)" (249d3). Indeed, the whole passage 249d paints the contrast between these two oblivions and further emphasizes the misfortune of the oblivious base state, whose multitude forgot the truths within, instead clinging to falsehoods that *should* be forgotten in order for them to pass through the rite of recollection. In fact, this base state is as such a stable, energetic minimum that—as I will now posit—to ascend out of it requires a stepwise process involving more than just the oblivion of the present. For I have equated oblivion of the present with recollection, whose mechanism of dialectic cannot be conducted by a soul in the state of absolute oblivion of the Forms. To engage in philosophical discourse requires firstly that a soul

[4] See David Farrell Krell, *Of Memory, Reminiscence, and Writing: On the Verge* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1990), 43-44, for a discussion of the presence (*parousia*) of the mnemic.

have already begun to recollect, that its wings have already begun to regrow; and secondly that a soul have tested, manipulated, and found fault with its prior conceptions of truth through playful discourse.

Having begun with the last stage of the ascension—the philosopher's recollection through dialectic—which corresponded with Augé's first figure of oblivion, I will continue to work backwards through this life narrative of the philosopher; I now explore the idea of playful discourse, as it corresponds with Augé's second figure:

> The second figure is that of *suspense*, whose first ambition is to find the present by provisionally cutting it off from the past and the future and, more precisely, by forgetting the future inasmuch as the latter is identified with the return of the past…. The sexual or social reversal that on these occasions is often played (in the theatrical sense of the term) demonstrates their exceptional and, in some way, temporary character (56; underlines are mine).

As I will later discuss, a soul that has begun to recollect the Forms by the agency of an earthly reminder is an initiate (ἀρτιτελής) that feels shock and revels in the novelty of the experience. It can be imagined then that such a soul, like a newborn, will engage in playful exploration of its newfound capacities to see the truths, and thus, to see itself.[5] The manner in which it does so is by rhetoric—not the serious, philosophical sort that is intended to return the soul to its divine-level past for a better future, but the playful sort full of mythology and imagery. This play is exactly what Socrates engages in during his pastoral conversation with Phaedrus, as he is divinely inspired by the local gods and the cicadas to give two speeches that he does not attribute to himself.[6] It is as if, lying down in the countryside, he has forgotten himself and the seriousness with which he conducts his dialectical business within the city, allowing a temporary suspense as he waits for the midday heat to leave. Indeed, the content of the speeches—the first arguing for something that he discredits in the second, and the second entering the realm of grandiose mythology while posing as a Palinode for Eros—confirms his playfulness. Socrates' own admission is hardly surprising when it comes: "The rest [of my second discourse] seems to me to be playful play (παιδιᾶι πεπαῖσθαι)" (265c8).

Socrates suspends his philosophical pursuit and is temporarily oblivious to the effort to know himself because, as is written in the *Republic*, he is "forming an image of the soul through words" (588b εἰκόνα πλάσαντες τῆς ψυχῆς λόγωι). This play of speech-giving, by which the philosopher describes the soul, offers an important educational benefit. As Jennifer Rapp writes, "soul is the self rightly understood," and "discourse can either obscure self-perception or engender the alternate modes of viewing through which

[5] In utilizing Augé's definition, I have expanded his use of the word "play" to encompass not just the theatrical staging of a role reversal, but also the fun activity of manipulation and discovery. These are not mutually exclusive, and I argue that Socrates undergoes a role reversal—from serious dialectician in the city to playful orator in the countryside—in order to manipulate his ideas with childlike wonder.

[6] See *Phdr.* 262d: καὶ ἔγωγε, ὦ Φαῖδρε, αἰτιῶμαι τοὺς ἐντοπίους θεούς: ἴσως δὲ καὶ οἱ τῶν Μουσῶν προφῆται οἱ ὑπὲρ κεφαλῆς ᾠδοὶ ἐπιπεπνευκότες ἂν ἡμῖν εἶεν τοῦτο τὸ γέρας: οὐ γάρ που ἔγωγε τέχνης τινὸς τοῦ λέγειν μέτοχος.

See also *Phdr.* 244a: ὁ μὲν πρότερος ἦν λόγος Φαίδρου τοῦ Πυθοκλέους, Μυρρινουσίου ἀνδρός: ὃν δὲ μέλλω λέγειν, Στησιχόρου τοῦ Εὐφήμου, Ἱμεραίου.

the self becomes seen more rightly."[7] Even though it is not dialectic and therefore cannot lead to a discovery of the Forms within us, playful discourse guides us towards developing the rhetorical authenticity and methodology by which dialectic can be conducted later.[8] Thus, this oblivion of the future, by which Socrates engages in a reversal of roles and becomes orator instead of dialectician, is beneficial for both the philosopher himself and his audience. Socrates, in suspended oblivion, reevaluates what he does and does not know about the soul by partaking in a mythological retelling of his own journey as a philosopher, and thereby reaffirming the authenticity of the beliefs that he has developed on his own. He does not, however, discover anything new. Phaedrus, his audience, is prepared by Socrates to engage in dialectic with him, and the pedagogical aim of his speeches therefore makes his playful discourse worthy instead of trivial: "In the discourses that are taught and spoken for the sake of learning and truly written in the soul concerning the just, the beautiful, and the good things—only in those discourses are clarity and perfection and the merit of seriousness (ἄξιον σπουδῆς)" (278a2-4). By its nature, Socrates' discourse is play because it is a mythological narrative instead of dialectic, but in its intention, it deserves seriousness because it looks forward to the serious process of dialectic. This therefore substantiates Plato's differentiation between "completely beautiful" play and "trivial" play (276e1 παγκάλην... παρὰ φαύλην παιδιάν); the former is conducted under suspended oblivion to find the present state of one's soul, while the latter under total oblivion of the Forms.[9]

An investigation of writing, which Plato explicitly links to oblivion and reminding, will further clarify this difference. Writing is always trivial play; neither is it dialectical, nor is it pedagogically purposeful. Even a philosopher's writing on justice cannot be didactic, for the inscriptions can neither support themselves with speech (λόγων ἀδυνάτων μὲν αὑτοῖς λόγωι βοηθεῖν) nor sufficiently teach truths (ἱκανῶς τἀληθὲς διδάξαι) to others (276c7-8). So, the philosopher must be content to use writing as "reminders (ὑπομνήματα) for himself 'when he reaches the old age of forgetfulness (τὸ λήθης γῆρας)'" (276d2-3). Socrates' Egyptian myth explains this incapacity to teach:

> For this thing will produce oblivion (λήθην) in the souls of those who learn it, because they will not practice their memory (μνήμης), since they will put their trust in writing, which is alien and depends on others' signs, instead of trying to recollect (ἀναμιμνησκόμενος) from the inside, by their own efforts. You discovered a drug not for remembering (μνήμης), but for reminding (ὑπομνήσεως). (275a2-6).

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[7] From Jennifer R. Rapp, *Ordinary Oblivion and the Self Unmoored* (New York: Fordham University Press, 2014), 1-3. For support for the alternate modes of viewing, cf. *Phdr*. 265d1-2: τούτων δέ τινων ἐκ τύχης ῥηθέντων δυοῖν εἰδοῖν, εἰ αὐτοῖν τὴν δύναμιν τέχνῃ λαβεῖν δύναιτό τις, οὐκ ἄχαρι. Yunis, 196: "The 'two forms of some kind' are the forms of thinking that together constitute dialectical reasoning, viz. collection and division; 'their power' is the power to speak and to think."

[8] See Andrea Nightingale, *Genres in Dialogue: Plato and the Construct of Philosophy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), for the discussion on authentic and alien discourse.

[9] Cf. Rapp 1-3 once more for the parallel I am drawing: Plato's "trivial" play in total oblivion is discourse that "obscure[s] self-perception," while Plato's "completely beautiful" play in suspended oblivion is discourse that "engender[s] the alternate modes of viewing through which the self becomes seen more rightly."

Written markings confuse the non-philosophical soul by giving it false hope. It fosters the impression that the soul is curing its forgetfulness and beginning the process of recollection, when in fact there is no autonomous construction of truth or internal reevaluation of opinion in the acts of reading and writing, respectively. Because the soul either internalizes others' truths without testing their authenticity or, worse, reminds itself of false opinions, it further steeps itself into total oblivion. Playful discourse is therefore a source of two completely different forms of oblivion: On the one hand, writing and trivial speeches harmfully augment the soul's oblivion at the base state; on the other, didactic speeches suspend the soul in its oblivion of the future, allowing it time to reevaluate, reauthenticate, and reaffirm its current knowledge to discover the Forms more rightly later.

As a building block to recollection, successful reevaluative play is only possible if the soul already has been elevated from the base state of total oblivion to some preliminary level of awakening. In the *Phaedrus*, the example mechanism for this awakening is the erotic initiation of the soul that has seen "a godlike face or bodily form that has imitated Beauty (κάλλος) [the Form] well" (251a3-4): "When the charioteer [of the soul] sees that face, his memory (ἡ μνήμη) is carried back to the nature of Beauty (πρὸς τὴν τοῦ κάλλους φύσιν)" (254b5-6). The activation of his memory triggers a vast array of symptoms, including most notably the regrowth of the wings. The reaction of the lover evokes lyric poetry and depicts such madness, nervousness, and longing that the lover undoubtedly becomes a changed man because of the experience; he begins to see his way out of total oblivion. Such an initiation evokes Augé's final figure of oblivion:

> The third is that of the *beginning* or, shall we say, the *rebeginning* (and it is understood that the latter term indicates the complete opposite of a repetition: a radical inauguration, the prefix *re-* implying that from then on, a same life may have several beginnings). It aspires to find the future again by forgetting the past, to create the conditions for a new birth that, by definition, opens up into every possible future without favoring a single one…. What is then, at the moment when a new awareness of time emerges, erased or forgotten is simultaneously the one the initiate no longer is and the one he is not yet, the same one and the other within him. The future to be found does not yet have a shape, or more precisely, it has the inceptive shape of the present. (57, underlines are mine)

Augé's *rebeginning* may seem radical for the *Phaedrus*, especially when one compares Augé's "forgetting the past to create the conditions for a new birth" with Socrates' ideas of metempsychosis and recollection in his second speech (248c-249d). However, by now it should be clear that Socrates' speech is playful discourse. If the speech is treated as a mythical narrative that has been delivered elaborately to match the elaborate soul of Phaedrus (271d-272a), then his descriptions of metempsychosis are likely allegorical. Indeed, Plato does not reference wings or chariots or a superheavenly realm when he writes in the *Meno*: "[T]he truth (ἡ ἀλήθεια) of the Forms (τῶν ὄντων) is always in our soul" (86b); and in the *Phaedo*: "[N]ecessarily, just as these Forms exist, just so much our soul exist even before we were born" (76e2-4). Therefore, metempsychosis is not even necessary for the assumed validity of the theory of recollection to be retained: The soul is immortal, it has lived through past incarnations during each of which it was

reminded of its knowledge of the Forms, and now the current incarnation of the soul must discover this past knowledge of the Forms as well.[10]

Using such a definition of anamnesis without the allegorical elements of metempsychosis, I will now turn to the characterization of the lover's initiation as a *rebeginning* through his soul's oblivion of the past. Such an oblivion is explicitly described by Socrates:

> No one is more important to it than the beautiful boy. It has forgotten (λέλησται) all of its mothers and brothers and friends, and when its wealth is destroyed through neglect (ἀμέλειαν), it regards it as nothing. And as for customs and decorous behavior, in which it formerly took pride, the soul, despising (καταφρονήσασα) all of those things, is ready to be a slave and to sleep wherever someone allows him, as near as possible to the object of its longing. (252a)

Surely it can be said that the lover's soul has changed drastically enough to warrant being described as newly born, for its past cares of family, wealth, and reputation are completely forgotten, and it is willing to even descend in social status. Considering that the men who practiced philosophy were often aristocratic, one can see that these are remarkable inversions of common Greek values. Once this state of oblivion has been reached, then metaphorically, the lover's wings begin to regrow (251b-e) through a double mechanism: Firstly, with an earthly instance of Beauty successfully reminding the lover of the Form, he "rebegins" the process of discovering all of the remaining Forms and rebuilding his remembrance (symbolized by the regrowth of the wings). Secondly, he begins the equally important step of forgetting the confounding factors and malnourishing opinions that had weighed him down in total oblivion. As this is a human's first philosophical transformation since its fall, it is an incredibly significant Platonic moment, and it is summarized beautifully by combining Augé's idea of potentiality in the oblivious rebirth with Kahn's notion of the soul's intrinsic identification with reality: "By falling in love (in the *Phaedrus*), the awakening of the soul to the understanding of noetic form is so exciting because it is a return to our down deep self, to the primordial nature of the soul" (131).

Elevated from the base state, the lover can now begin both "an assigned mode of life and philosophy" (256a6 τεταγμένην τε δίαιταν καὶ φιλοσοφίαν) with his beloved, together engaging in a mutual search for the knowledge that each has briefly experienced.[11] A philosophical lover becomes in charge of developing the talent for philosophy of his beloved and, as is necessary, conducting research of their patron god by "laying hold of the god with memory (τῆι μνήμηι)" (252e1-253a7). This is the point,

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[10] Charles Kahn, 2006: 131 goes further to state that not just metempsychosis, but the whole theory of "recollection serves only as a mythical narrative to identify a transcendental source for this capacity to transcend sensory experience." However, his argument is complex and can be construed as "modernizing" Plato. Given the occurrence of anamnesis in three Platonic dialogues, I assume it to be a serious Platonic theory. What I do question is Plato's seriousness in describing such phenomena as body swapping and the three thousand years it takes a philosopher's soul to regrow wings (*Phdr.* 249a-b). It is important to remember that these Platonic elements that make Augé's ideas of "a new birth" seem radical, comprise an "*allegory* of the chariot" that appears only in the *Phaedrus*.

[11] See *Phdr.* 255c-e. The "backlove" experienced by the beautiful boy leads him to also glimpse Beauty.

then, when *eros* becomes pederastic philosophy and where the narrative connects, as the reborn lover engages in playful discourse to educate his boy's mind.

In summary, it is these connections between states of oblivion that unite the *Phaedrus*' conversations under the plane tree into a continuous narrative of the philosophical transformations of the soul. With *eros* as the catalyst, the philosophical lover begins the lifelong regrowth of its wings, a process that is Plato's metaphorical equivalent for the recovery of the soul's remembrance. As the winged memory is reconstituted, its outlines are crafted by selective oblivion—selective because a different dimension of time must be forgotten for the philosopher to proceed from one step to another. It is first necessary for the soul to forget the totally oblivious base state of the past in order for the remembrance to begin its rebirth. It is then necessary for the soul to forget the serious, dialectical future in order to focus on the playful present, when the authenticity of discourse is tested and the nature of the soul is imaged and taught. Finally, it is necessary for the soul to forget the present and return to its knowledgeable past, using dialectic to manipulate our sensory perceptions of the world into unified theories of knowledge (249b-c). In the *Phaedrus*, therefore, oblivion itself is an entire dimension, in which the journey of recollection is mapped and staged, twisting its way through *eros*, writing, speech-giving, and mythologizing. For a soul at any part of that journey, Marc Augé's words ring true: "[T]ell me what you forget and I will tell you who you are" (18).

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Covert Commentaries on Problematic Unions: Epic Similes in Book 4 Canto 3 of *The Faerie Queene*

Abstract

The competition for Canacee's hand that lies at the heart of Book 4 Canto 3 of *The Faerie Queene* is based on a problematic, incestuous premise about which the text's narrator does not presents any overt commentary. Despite this apparent silence, however, the two epic similes utilized to describe the battle between Cambell and Diamond, when considered with Spenser's use of animal imagery elsewhere in *The Faerie Queene*, offer a covert condemnation of the contention and its contenders. An analysis of these epic similes not only elucidates the narrator's distain for both Cambell and the three mond-brothers but also demonstrates Spenser's careful and complicated use of epic similes. They are not, as some scholars have suggested, mere decoration; rather, they stand as purposeful and imperative additions to Spenser's text.

The competition for Canacee's hand depicted in Book 4 Canto 3 of *The Faerie Queene* is problematic from its very foundation. When it is revealed that Cambell arranges the tournament so that, of those interested in the contest, "They by consent should chose the stoutest three / That with himselfe should combat for her sake, / And of them all the victour should his sister take" the issue at hand is brought sharply into focus.[1] Cambell arranges a competition that, if it proceeds as he desires, will culminate with a brother winning his sister's hand in marriage.

Even before the terms of the competition are announced, the text never shies away from explicitly outlining the relationship between Cambell and Canacee. The narrator begins his retelling of the tale that "wicked Time…doth waste" with "*Cambelloes sister* was fayre *Canacee*," linking the two immediately and establishing their fraternal bond.[2] To complement Cambell's manufacture of a tournament that permits the possibility that he will be the victor, Canacee's role in pursuing a specific conclusion for the competition is also made quite clear. The narrator initially reveals how "Full many Lords, and many Knights her loued, / Yet she to none of them her liking lent."[3] After highlighting Canacee's disdain for the various suitors who have sought her love, the text explains that, to allow Cambell to win his own competition, "his sisters skill vnto him lent…a ring, which she him sent."[4] This ring "Had power to staunch al wounds, that mortally did bleed" and could, in theory, secure a clear victory for Cambell.[5] Thus, Cambell conceives

[1] Edmund Spenser, *The Faerie Queene*. Second Edition, Ed. A.C. Hamilton et al. (New York: Rutledge, 2013), 4.2.38.7-9.
[2] Spenser, *The Faerie Queene*, 4.2.33.1; 4.2.35.1; emphasis on "sister" added).
[3] Spenser, *The Faerie Queene*, 4.2.36.1-2.
[4] Spenser, *The Faerie Queene*, 4.2.39.5; 7.
[5] Spenser, *The Faerie Queene*, 4.2.39.9.

the tournament, and Canacee ensures that he will win it. However, despite the clearly delineated framework of the competition, which in no way attempts to shield the reader from recognizing the probable incestuous consequences of the contest, *The Faerie Queene* never overtly comments on the disputable morality of such a union.

Neither does the text offer any direct remarks concerning the second fraternally-wrought detail of Cambell's competition. The three competitors that rise against him are the brothers Triamond, Diamond, and Priamond, who "t'increase affection naturall, / In loue of *Canacee* they ioyned all."[6] The specifics of their arrangement are not entirely clear, but these terms highlight a thrice-held aim to gain Canacee that somehow reverberates back upon the three brothers, binding them, hypothetically, in an entangled four-way bond of affection. This, too, has incestuous implications that are left completely unexplored by the narrator, who is in fact quite happy to insert his concrete opinion elsewhere in the text.

However, this lack of overt commentary addressing the quite possible and problematic consequences of Cambell's tournament does not necessarily mean that the text does not convey an opinion regarding the issue altogether. Rather, this commentary may be expressed indirectly through the epic similes utilized to describe the battle between Cambell and the assorted mond- brothers[7] in Canto 3. There, the animals and actions that depict these competitors stress primal, physical hunger and illegitimate desire, and these similes, then, provide the moral judgment that the narrator eschews expressing more plainly. Through these similes, the text asserts a view that not only finds a union between Cambell and Canacee undesirable, but wherein the mond- brothers, too, with their ambiguous fraternal boundaries, are condemned for their participation in this incestuous bout.

The two epic similes in question occur about one third through Canto 3 and specifically ornament the confrontation between Cambell and Diamond. They are provided in full below for easy reference throughout this discussion, although relevant passages will be cited as necessary.

> As when two Tygers prickt with hungers rage,
> Haue by good fortune found some beasts fresh spoyle,
> On which they weene their famine to asswage, And gaine a feastfull guerdon of their toyle, Both falling out doe stirre vp strifefull broyle, And cruell battell twixt themselues doe make, Whiles neither lets the other touch the soyle, But either sdeignes with other to partake:
> So cruelly these Knights stroue for that Ladies sake.[8]

> As when a Vulture greedie of his pray,
> Through hunger long, that hart to him doth lend,
> Strikes at an Heron with all his bodies sway,
> That from his force seemes nought may it defend;

[6] Spenser, *The Faerie Queene*, 4.2.54.5-6.
[7] This title for the coalition of Priamond, Diamond, and Triamond has been inspired by Kuzner's "brothers –mond" in "'Without Respect of Utility': Precarious Life and the Politics of Edmund Spenser's *Legend of Friendship"* from *Open Subjects* (2012).
[8] Spenser, *The Faerie Queene*, 4.3.16.1-9.

> The warie fowle that spies him toward bend His dreadfull souse auoydes,
> it shunning light, And maketh him his wing in vaine to spend;
> That with the weight of his owne weeldlesse might,
> He falleth nigh to ground, and scarse recouereth flight.[9]

There are three aspects of these similes that may suggest their use as commentaries on the problematic aspect of the competition at hand. First, there is both the choice of animal and the reflective connotations of that animal on the character it represents. In stanza 16, Cambell and Diamond contend as "two Tygers."[10]

There are no previous similes in which tigers are represented, and initially it is difficult to fully discern how the creature should be interpreted. However, its usage here may evoke the perhaps expected creature one might use to symbolize physical valor and fierce strength and which has in fact been utilized dramatically by the text in prior events: the lion. It is the very lack of the lion in this stanza that initially complicates the tiger, for previously the text has used lions as powerfully positive creatures. The lion itself is used in other epic similes, such as that in Book 2 after Arthur's sword is broken while in combat with Cymochles. When the Palmer gives Arthur Guyon's sword as a substitute, Arthur is "like a Lyon, which hath long time saught / His robbed whelps and at the last them fond / Emongst the shepeheard swaynes, then wexeth wood and yond."[11] Arthur, having been given a tool to furnish his justified outrage over Guyon's mistreatment at the hands of Pyrrhocles and Cymochles, is once again able to enter the fray.[12] Here, the lion is utilized to characterize a noble character protecting a fellow knight from being shamefully despoiled.

The lion is also a dramatic presence in Book 1, although not in the form of an epic simile. After a "Lyon…Hunting full greedie after saluage blood"[13] pacifies himself upon discovering the desolate Vna, she in turn remarks:

> The Lyon Lord of euerie beast in field,
> Quoth she, his princely puissance doth abate,
> And mightie proud to humble weake does yield, Forgetfull of the hungry rage, which late
> Him prickt, in pittie of my sad estate[14]

Vna's address, through its acknowledgement of the lion as "Lord" and depiction of the creature's self-control, stresses the lion's nobility and even rationality. Madeleine Pelner Cosman sums up the usage of the lion in *The Faerie Queene* very neatly:

> The lion's fierce physical prowess and nobility of emotion afford appropriate similes for the virtues each Champion in turn defends…Spenser's repeated image for Moral Man's fight to retain

[9] Spenser, *The Faerie Queene,* 4.3.19.1-9.
[10] Spenser, *The Faerie Queene,* 4.3.16.1.
[11] Spenser, *The Faerie Queene,* 2.8.40.7-9.
[12] Spenser, *The Faerie Queene,* 2.8.41.
[13] Spenser, *The Faerie Queene,* 1.3.5.3.
[14] Spenser, *The Faerie Queene,* 1.3.7.1-5.

> dignity amidst worldly temptations is the lion's struggle to maintain supremacy among beasts.[15]

If this positive portrayal of the lion may be then contrasted with the choice of a tiger to describe both Cambell and Diamond, then the tiger may indeed lack the lion's restraint and noble nature while still embodying the ferocity and physical vigor necessary for the epic simile to work.

Such an analysis may be further substantiated when considering the remainder of *The Faerie Queene* following Book 4 Canto 3. In Book 5, the tiger is much more prominent than in earlier books and is used most notably in two specific instances. The first occurs in Canto 5 after Radigund begins to fall into melancholy for love of Artegall, who she has enslaved and dressed in woman's clothes, and bides Clarinda to move the defeated man on her behalf.[16] As Clarinda first attempts to turn Artegall's affections toward Radigund, she remarks that her mistress, "though she still haue worne / Her days in warre, yet (weet thou) was not borne / Of Bears and *Tygres*, nor so saluage mynded."[17] By mentioning the bear and the tiger for contrast, Clarinda utilizes these animals as emblems of the very savageness and ferocity that Radigund, she argues, does not possess. A similar use of the tiger arises in Canto 7 of the same book. There, Britomart meets Radigund in combat, and their encounter is described, "As when a Tygre and Lionesse /Are met at spoyling of some hungry pray."[18] The tiger is here again associated with Radigund, as it is the tiger who "clawes" first and mirrors Radigund's initial outpouring of blows in the following stanza.[19] Although both women here engage in ferocious combat, Britomart will eventually defeat Radigund and free Artegall from his servitude.[20] Once again, the tiger stands as a representation of sheer ferocity inferior to the lion(ess) that will appear as the noble victor.

To take a further look at the narrative´s relationship with these jungle cats, one might examine Arthur F. Marotti's explanation for Spenser's use of the tiger, which asks that one look back at *The Faerie Queene*'s earlier books with a broader lens. Pointing to classical texts and myths as the source of Spenser's conception of the animal, he explains "Tigers are said to have drawn the chariot of Bacchus when he crossed the Tigris River and, through this association with the god of wine, acquired symbolic significances."[21] Among these are "cruelty, inhumanity, and ferocity…They are emblematic of a complete inversion of reason and passion, and represent that state in which man is most inhuman."[22] To accompany this explanation, Marotti[23] points out that Maleger begins his attack on the House of Alma in Canto 11 of Book 2 by riding in "Vpon a Tygre swift and

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[15] Madeleine Pelner Cosman, "Spenser's Ark of Animals: Animal Imagery in the Faery Queen," Studies in English Literature, 1500-1900, 3.1 (1963), 86.
[16] Spenser, The Faerie Queene, 5.5.32-33.
[17] Spenser, *The Faerie Queene,* 5.5.40.4-6; emphasis added.
[18] Spenser, *The Faerie Queene,* 5.7.30.1-2.
[19] Spenser, *The Faerie Queene,* 5.7.30.4; 5.7.31.
[20] Spenser, *The Faerie Queene,* 5.7.34-41
[21] Arthur F. Marotti, "Animal Symbolism in the *Faerie Queene*: Tradition and the Poetic Context," *Studies in English Literature, 1500-1900,* 5.1 (1965), 77.
[22] Ibid.
[23] Ibid.

fierce."[24] Maleger, a creature of massive strength and violence described as "Flesh without blood, a person without spright…That could doe harm, yet could not harmed bee,/ That could not die, yet seemed a mortall wight," is surely as far from nobility and rationality as one could imagine.[25] While Maleger riding atop a tiger is a smaller detail, and the tiger itself is not described with any anthropomorphic characteristics in a way similar to Vna's lion in Book 1, it still stands as a usage of the creature wherein the animal is associated with a purely malevolent character.

A careful analysis, then, of the independent usages of the lion and the tiger throughout the *Faerie Queene* emphasizes that the two animals are in no way interchangeable, as may be expected by their similarity as large jungle cats of great strength. Rather, the lion is firmly situated as a virtuous creature whereas the tiger represents a savage brutality that lacks an understanding that might govern its strength. To label Cambell and Diamond both as tigers, then, highlights their possession of a physical capability that lacks an honorable direction. The fact
that the pair is represented as tigers, in addition, is worth note when compared to the combined use of the lioness and the tiger to represent Britomart and Radigund respectively. There, one character is praised and the other is treated with disapproval even while they both engage in savage combat. In this simile, both characters are made tigers and thus both are condemned: neither Cambell nor Diamond is in the right in the eyes of the text.

Stanza 19 uses rather different creatures, one of which may more blatantly call questionable attributes to attention than the other. Diamond, the one striking in the previous stanza, is described as "a Vulture greedie of his pray," whereas Cambell is the fleeing "Heron."[26]

This is the only appearance of the vulture in an epic simile throughout *The Faerie Queene*, which means it is impossible to compare it with any others in an attempt to better analyze the text's opinion of the bird. However, vultures, due to their widespread consumption of carrion meat (although this vulture seeks live flesh, spurred on by "hunger long"), may be popularly associated with scavengers and are rarely tied, through their own merit, to any sort of bravery, nobility, or related virtue in literature or folklore more generally. Perhaps the most famous mythic vulture is that which arrives each day to devour the constantly regenerating liver of Prometheus: the titan who stole fire from the gods to bestow it upon mankind. In that case, one might desire to adorn the bird with positive connotations: i.e., if Cambell is the one retreating from this vulture, then he is the symbolic Prometheus, punished for a noble deed. The trouble with such an interpretation here is that the vulture alone cannot evoke the myth in a satisfying way; the target of its attack must also allude to Prometheus, and nothing in the heron's actions, nor in the larger simile, fulfill this task. In either case, the vulture remains a negative figure. As a secondary consequence of this interpretation, the heron receives no nobility either: more on this to come.

In an attempt to locate a mildly contemporary parallel to substantiate the claim that the vulture possessed negative connotations in the period in which *The Faerie Queene* was written, one might briefly turn to Shakespeare. Anthony Brian Taylor

[24] Spenser, *The Faerie Queene*, 2.11.20.4.
[25] Spenser, *The Faerie Queene*, 2.11.40.4; 6-7.
[26] Spenser, *The Faerie Queene*, 4.3.19.1; 3.

highlights Pistol's curse of "Let vultures gripe thy guts!", directed at Falstaff in *The Merry Wives of Windsor*."[27] Taylor remarks that Pistol's goal here is not to wish "a bloody death" for Falstaff, "but a fitting torment in hell. He is recalling the plight of Tityus…whose punishment is to have his own ever-renewing 'guts' constantly fed on by vultures."[28] *The Faerie Queene* is itself aware of this mythic association, for it cites that "*Tityus* fed a vultur on his maw."[29][30]Deborah Willis considers a similar use of the vulture in Shakespeare's *Titus Andronicus*, where a "gnawing vulture" represents a perpetual torment for Tamora.[31] From these examples, one of which points to the only other mention of the vulture in *The Faerie Queene*, it is in no way unfounded to suggest that Spenser, too, would have shared this wholly negative and gruesome association with the bird.

The heron is used in one other simile in *The Faerie Queene*, and a comparison with this depiction of the creature may shed light on what connotations the bird might possess as a reflection of Cambell."[32] In Book 2, Canto 11, one of Arthur's unsuccessful attempts to defeat Maleger is initially described "As when *Ioues* harnesse-bearing Bird from hie / Stoupes at a flying heron with proud disdayne."[33] Here, since Arthur has just attacked Melager, fruitlessly, as the remainder of the simile and the following stanza will show, he is the "harnesse-bearing Bird" belonging to Jove. He is thus elevated by a connection to a divinity of the highest prestige, whereas the heron this bird attacks is viewed merely with "proud disdayne" by its attacker. The heron therefore seems to be a bird of no account, a target that other, stronger predators treat with contempt. When considering Book 4's simile in light of that in Book 2, the text also appears to focus there on the heron's role as disdained victim. By comparing Cambell to a heron in Canto 3, the narrative depicts him as a weak bird of little worth. While this does not necessarily have moral connotations in the way that the choice of the tiger over the lion appears to, it does reduce Cambell in scope and label him as a less than noble character.

After observing the overall use of these specific animals throughout *The Faerie Queene*, their appearance in these two epic similes may represent negative aspects of the situation at hand. Before elaborating on this point further, the second and third notable aspects of the similes should be considered. The second point worth highlighting is the use of the word "hunger." Both stanzas include it. The tigers are "prickt with hungers rage," and the vulture acts "Through hunger long."[34] This idea of a physical, and perhaps even carnal, desire, as represented through hunger fully permeates both stanzas, standing

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[27] Anthony Brian Taylor, "'Let vultures gripe thy guts': Pistol cursing Falstaff in particularly apt terms," *Notes & Queries*, 41.1 (1994), 37.
[28] Taylor, "Pistol cursing Falstaff," 35.
[29] Spenser, *The Faerie Queene*, 1.5.35.6.
[30] Here, we might reconsider our discussion of Prometheus and see whether the Tityus myth is a better fix for the simile. It may be, in fact, since Tityus is punished for the rape of Leto; this offers a more direct parallel to *The Faerie Queene*'s competition. However, the same problem persists here as well, in that the heron does not evoke this myth.
[31] Deborah, Willis. "'The Gnawing Vulture': Revenge, Trauma, Theory, and 'Titus Andronicus,'" *Shakespeare Quarterly*, 53.1 (2002), 36.
[32] Cosman, "Spenser's Ark," 106.
[33] Spenser, *The Faerie Queene*, 2.11.43.1-2.
[34] Spenser, *The Faerie Queene*, 4.3.16.1; 4.3.19.2.

as the original motivation for both bestial encounters. It thereby must be essential to the current situation. Considering that these animals in turn stand as representations of the knights currently locked in combat over the hand of Canacee, the animals' hunger could easily be a reflection of the possible sexual hunger associated with winning a desirable, and here actively desired, woman. At the same time, the more immediate suggestion offered by wild animals motivated by hunger should not be overlooked. Both the tigers and the vulture are targeting prey that they wish to physically devour: to consume and to make part of their own bodies. With this in mind, Canacee is not only a prize to be won sexually, but also one to be possessed in every facet and to become part of the victor. As we will see, such a blurring of boundaries of personal identity is completely in tone with the episode.

The third aspect of the similes that should be drawn out is what exactly happens in the course of each of them. In the first simile, the two tigers "Haue by good fortune found some beasts fresh spoyle" and then proceed to battle over who may consume it.[35] The idea here is that these tigers have happened upon and are claiming the conquest of another, unknown beast. These are not two animals that have, through their own prowess and might, defeated another creature. Rather, they are scavengers of another's win. When considering these two tigers as Cambell and Diamond, the most obvious substitution for the "fresh spoyle" that they contend over is Canacee herself. The entire stanza then, by representing two creatures battling over the belongings of another, may emphasis that neither Cambell nor Diamond, as they now stand, has a legitimate claim, or at least one that has been approved by the narrator, over Canacee.

The vulture, in contrast, attacks the heron, again, due to "hunger long that hart to him doth lend.[36] This in itself might not seem problematic, especially as a direct comparison with the situation between Cambell, Diamond, and Canacee does not seem readily available, but it does in fact clarify an interesting aspect of the earlier stanza. A vulture, known culturally through its role as a scavenger, is here drawn to an active fight, whereas the tigers of the earlier stanza, great hunters, are transformed into scavengers. It is this very reversal that creates an overall sense of "wrongness" between these two similes. In this reversal, all parties adopt roles improper to their established identity. Things, here, are unnatural, and this unbalanced state, too, reflects back on the current contest and its participants.

Taking these three points as a springboard, these similes work together to indirectly, if not covertly, point to the inherent problems surrounding the contest for Canacee's hand that the narrator leaves unaddressed. The stanzas suggest an unnatural contention, and their actors are encapsulated in animals that the text imbues repeatedly with ignoble traits that in turn rebound upon the original human characters.

Although it does seem clear that these epic similes reflect negatively on both Cambell and Diamond and criticize their current combat as an unnatural and claimless competition, the similes themselves do not reveal why exactly these two knights and their bout should be held in contempt. To find an answer to this question, one must step back and consider the similes in their greater context. The most simple and obvious facet of this answer, as has been alluded to several times previously, is that Cambell is competing for his sister's hand. As Cambell creates the competition and is directly aided by

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[35] Spenser, *The Faerie Queene,* 4.3.16.2.
[36] Spenser, *The Faerie Queene,"* 4.3.19.2.

Canacee, the brother-sister relationship does appear to be the main focus.[37] The incestuous complications edifying this relationship have already been identified, and it becomes reasonably clear, after acknowledging these complications, why the text would find the need to criticize such a union. However, it cannot be ignored that Diamond is here both a tiger and a vulture and appears to also receive the stanzas' condemnation for his participation in this event. It may then be that this protest against fraternal relations spreads beyond that of Cambell and Canacee and touches upon the three brothers who believe that "loue of *Canacee*" acts "t'increase affection naturall."[38]

In his discussion of Spenser's representation of friendship in Book 4, James Kuzner explores relationships between various friendly pairs that sacrifice the bounded self for a vulnerable union. As an aside to his consideration of Triamond and Cambell's friendship, Kuzner remarks that "A life more tolerable" for Triamond "is the one he leads with his similarly named brothers…Much more pleasure is the indistinction of this prior life."[39] Kuzner contrasts this to the manufactured relationship between Cambell and Triamond and stresses that "the brothers –mond are now like Montainean friends; they lack the vocabulary of separation and difference."[40] Kuzner also notes that Spenser appears to celebrate their "shared weakness" as "what fascinates Spenser is the moment of Diamond's dying."[41] Kuzner attributes this fascination to Spenser's investment in the unbounded self, as Diamond's decapitation and subsequent ability to briefly remain standing due to his absorption of Priamond's soul belies a "being without a self."[42] While it is true that the relationship between the mond-brothers is depicted as one lacking boundaries and based securely on fraternal affection, this idea of a relationship where the self remains unbounded may be represented as a more problematic one than Kuzner acknowledges when taken into consideration with Diamond's inclusion in those condemned in the epic similes.

If Cambell is maligned through these literary devices due to his fervor in securing a relationship with his kin, it would not be unfair to say the text views three boundary-less brothers entering the fray to win the same woman in similar terms. As mentioned in the introduction of this paper, the text never fully outlines what the mond-brothers plan to do after the competition for Canacee has been decided. Presumably, as they are entering a competition together and with affection, they expect one of them to win, and if they truly do, as Kuzner suggests, "lack the vocabulary of separation and difference" then this becomes complicated. Would Canacee remain with one brother or be shared between the three? Could she even truly create a relationship with or marry one brother when he is indistinguishable from the two remaining? The boundaries become complicated here, and the text permits a conclusion of a four-way expression of
affection that, as a result, returns to incestuous consequences to be a perfectly valid interpretation.

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[37] Spenser, *The Faerie Queene*, 4.2.35.
[38] Spenser, *The Faerie Queene*, 4.2.54.4-5.
[39] James Kuzner, *Open Subjects: English Renaissance Republicans, Modern Selfhoods, and the Virtue of Vulnerability*, (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2012), 61.
[40] Kuzner, *Open Subjects*, 62.
[41] Ibid, 62.
[42] Ibid, 62.

The entry of Priamond, Diamond, and Triamond into Cambell's competition is thus fraught with the same problematic consequences as Cambell's own participation. Therefore, it is understandable that Diamond be included with Cambell as a target of the similes' condemnation. To further press this point, one might consider how this combat ends. As Triamond and Cambell engage in a wearisome and perpetual fight, Cambina arrives with a wand of peace and a drink of nepenthe.[43] She "smote them lightly with her powerful wand" and "Her golden cup to them to drink she raught."[44] As a result, "Instead of strokes, each other kissed glad, / And louely haulst from feare of treason free, / And plighted hands for euer friends to be."[45] The canto then concludes with Cambell being matched with Cambina while Triamond receives Canacee. Here, everything is wrapped up in a way that avoids any problematic conclusion. Cambell is given an alternative to Canacee, and Triamond is left void of his two brothers and may engage in a singular and personal relationship with Canacee. The fact that the narrative concludes in this abrupt and unexpected manner aligns quite neatly with the indirectly expressed distaste embodied in the epic similes explored previously. If these relationships were not problematic, the text need not provide every necessary barrier to prevent them from being consummated.

Taking further consideration of the epic similes presented in Book 4 Canto 3 of *The Faerie Queene* serves two related but independent purposes. The first is that such an analysis notes what the text indicates rather than announces; what is expressed through subversive symbolism rather than what is proclaimed through a narrator's intervening voice. In this way, it may reveal the text's hidden opinion about a highly problematic episode. The second purpose of such criticism is to highlight the possible complexities contained in a literary technique that may be overlooked as merely decorative or the simple remnant of a classical tradition. Consider Judith Dundas' explanation of Spenser's use of the epic simile as one example:

> At last we come to what many readers assume to be the most pictorial parts of the poem, or what they think of when imagery is mentioned – the epic simile…these images have no narrative burden to carry, being indeed set off from the narrative by "like" or "as": their purpose, therefore, is purely to illustrate concepts.[46]

Dundas creates a contrast between readers' conception of the similes, where they are admirable descriptive devices, with her own perception that they are flimsy ornaments. However, such a judgment ignores the intricate allusions and symbolic interrogation offered by this literary device and reduces it to the simplest version of itself. Dundas' opinion should not be taken to represent the whole of scholarship, but her stance is a traditional and quite pervasive one. By analyzing these highly suggestive epic similes in Book 4 Canto 3, one may reach a better appreciation for Spenser's use of the device

[43] Spenser, *The Faerie Queene*, 4.3.42-43.
[44] Spenser, *The Faerie Queene*, 4.3.48.2; 8.
[45] Spenser, *The Faerie Queene*, 4.3.49.3-5.
[46] Judith Dundas, "The Rhetorical Basis of Spenser's Imagery," *Studies in English, 1500-1900*, 8.1 (1968), 72.

altogether and suggest that dismissing these similes as purely decorative is highly misguided. The results offered by truly reading the epic similes that adorn the contest between Cambell and Diamond do indeed stress the tournament's problematic nature and offer a reading of Book 4 Canto 3 that might otherwise be entirely unavailable even to the most scrupulous reader.

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
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